

# THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOL. XXVIII. No. 4.

OCTOBER 1936

## THE RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

*By* E. L. CLARKE

### PART II<sup>1</sup>: THE WAY TO THE UNIVERSITIES

IN a previous paper I brought evidence to show that, contrary to general belief, the Public Schools and the Public School idea date in the main, not from the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, but from the nineteenth century; that they are concerned with the education of a class; and that the private school<sup>2</sup> system as a whole (of which the Public Schools are part) is not merely supplementary to, and parallel with, the State system, but is a rival to it. This rivalry is not simply a matter of providing the best educational facilities. Since the schools act as recruiting agents for the occupations of life, the struggle for the best positions is extended into the schools, and is a large part of the rivalry between these two groups of schools.

In the question with which I am concerned—the opportunities open to able boys of rising to positions of leadership through the universities—if it could be shown that the State schools offer opportunities equal to those offered by the private schools, taking into account the size of the population group which each set of schools serves, the conclusions which I reached above would be of purely academic interest. The

<sup>1</sup> Part I appeared in *THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW* for July 1936.

<sup>2</sup> I use the term "private school" throughout in the official sense of a school not assisted by grant, and therefore not taking "special place" pupils.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

object of the present paper is to show certain inequalities of opportunity and to discover reasons for them.

Discussion of this question has previously been difficult because, in the absence of precise knowledge, there has been a vague belief that the occurrence of high ability in the children of the wealthier classes may be so much more frequent than among the children of the poorer classes that a disproportionate allotment of opportunities to the former may be justified on the score of ability. The researches of Mr. Gray and Miss Moshinsky, recently published in *THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, have thrown some light on this question. Their investigations confirmed the belief in the "existence in the general school population of a small but positive correlation between the intelligence of children and the socio-economic status of their parents."<sup>1</sup> But though, for example, 59.3 per cent. of the children of the professional classes attained an I.Q. of 130 or over, as compared with 18.3 per cent. for unskilled wage-earners, the contribution of the professional classes to the total number of children of this level of intelligence was only 5.1 per cent., while skilled manual workers contributed 30.8 per cent., and unskilled manual workers 15.7 per cent.<sup>2</sup> The numerical preponderance of the poorer classes much more than makes up for the less frequent occurrence of high ability in them. In the light of these figures we can examine representation at the universities.

### I. THE UNIVERSITIES: GENERAL FIGURES

In *The Poor Student and the University* (Allen & Unwin, 1933), Miss D. Whiteley showed many of the weaknesses in the provision for poor students. The following figures (taken from pages 32, 38, 39 of her book) compare the percentage of assisted undergraduate students in 1928-9 with the percentage of ex-elementary school students in residence in 1929-30.

<sup>1</sup> *THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, July 1935, p. 296.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 314-15.

## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

	Assisted Students, 1928-9.	Ex-elementary, 1929-30.
All English Universities	. 40.6	18.4
Welsh Universities	. 67.3	54.7
Oxford and Cambridge	. 38.0	10.8 <sup>1</sup>
London	. 34.0	15.6 <sup>1</sup>
Provincial Universities	. 54.0	36.1 <sup>1</sup>

Since about 90 per cent. of the population pass through the elementary schools, it is clear at the start that the elementary schools are very inadequately represented at the universities, especially Oxford and Cambridge and London. Miss Whiteley rightly calls attention to the large amount of assistance which is being given to the other 10 per cent. of the population, and attributes it to the wealthy endowments of the Public Schools and the activities of charitable trusts.

The next set of figures refers to the entries into Oxford and Cambridge and London in 1932-3, and compares (a) the total entries from grant-aided secondary schools with (b) the entries of ex-elementary school pupils and (c) the entries of pupils paying no fees at the schools they were leaving. All the pupils given under (b) and (c) are included in (a), and (b) and (c) overlap considerably.<sup>2</sup>

	Oxford and Cambridge.	London.
Total Entries . . . . .	3,530	3,998
(a) Entries from grant-aided secondary schools . . . . .	828	1,089
Percentage of Total . . . . .	23.5	27.2
(b) Entries of ex-elementary school pupils . . . . .	424	620
Percentage of Total . . . . .	12.0	15.5
(c) Entries of pupils paying no fees at school . . . . .	476	605
Percentage of Total . . . . .	13.5	15.1

If we make allowance for overseas students (between 8.6 and 10.9 per cent. at Oxford and Cambridge, and 15.5 per cent. at London, in residence) and for a number of students who go to the universities after an interval and are therefore

<sup>1</sup> These are percentages of entries, not of students in residence.

<sup>2</sup> The materials for these figures are in *Education in 1933: the Report of the Board of Education for the Year 1933*, p. 146. It is noted there that owing to some pupils going to the universities after an interval the numbers from grant-aided schools are not strictly comparable with the total. There seems to be no reason, however, for thinking that this affects comparison of the numbers within the grant-aided schools group.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

not included among the figures of those leaving grant-aided secondary schools, the numbers going to these universities from such schools are still small, in comparison to the population group from which their pupils are drawn. It must be remembered that the grant-aided secondary schools are the only avenue to the universities for the great majority of the population, including almost all those who use the elementary schools.

Even in the grant-aided secondary schools the ex-elementary school pupils do not hold their own. In 1932-3 ex-elementary school pupils were 74 per cent. of the pupils in grant-aided secondary schools,<sup>1</sup> yet at the three universities, for which figures are given, the ex-elementary school entries were little more than half the total from the grant-aided secondary schools, although the pupils holding "special places" are almost all from the elementary schools. The figures for the non-paying pupils are more encouraging. These pupils formed 49 per cent. of the pupils at grant-aided secondary schools, but provided 57 per cent. of the entries from these schools into Oxford and Cambridge.

Many of the reasons for the inadequate representation of the grant-aided secondary schools, and more particularly of the elementary schools, at Oxford and Cambridge, have been given by Miss Whiteley. They include the high cost of courses there, the insufficiency of grants by Local Authorities, and the great differences between Local Authorities in the amounts which they give and the conditions of award. There is no need for me to underline what she has said on this subject. But there is one aspect of the question which was largely outside the scope of her survey, and on which I wish to concentrate attention.

The large number of open scholarships awarded every year at Oxford and Cambridge can be gained by merit alone. Moreover, the possession of an open scholarship usually means that the holder will receive enough help in addition,

<sup>1</sup> *Education in 1933*, p. 130.



## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

either from the university or from the Local Authority, to enable him to go to the university. We might expect that the grant-aided schools would win an adequate share of these scholarships. But, although their share of them is increasing, it is not yet at all proportionate to the size of the population group on which they draw. In 1932-3 they won 335, as against 254 won by the private (i.e. non-aided) schools.<sup>1</sup> The fact that they now win more scholarships each year than the private schools has caused disquiet amongst the latter and some complacency amongst supporters of the State system. This complacency leaves out of account an essential difference between the State and the private systems. We are not simply to compare two sets of secondary schools, but on the one side schools which are recruited on a basis of wealth from a small section of the community, and on the other schools which represent the only avenue to the university for the great majority of the population, and which should contain, if the system of "special places" is working properly, all the ablest children in that great majority.

Gray and Moshinsky give the numbers in the elementary schools as fifteen times as great as those in the preparatory and private schools.<sup>2</sup> For the present purpose this figure should be increased, since many children in private schools of elementary type go on to use the grant-aided secondary schools, while few go from public elementary schools to private secondary schools. If ability were evenly distributed throughout the community the grant-aided secondary schools should win at least fifteen times as many open scholarships as the private schools. The relatively greater frequency of the occurrence of high ability in the wealthier classes reduces, though it does not neutralize, this preponderance. In Gray and Moshinsky's investigation, pupils at private and preparatory schools made up only 13·3 per cent. of those with I.B. of 130 and over, the remaining 86·7 per cent. being made up of free pupils and fee-paying pupils at grant-

<sup>1</sup> *Education in 1933*, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> *THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, April 1935, p. 151.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

aided secondary schools.<sup>1</sup> On these figures we might expect the grant-aided secondary schools to win six times as many scholarships as the private schools, if the distribution of the highest kind of intelligence, which wins university scholarships, follows the same rules as that of slightly lower grades.

Enough has been said to show that the figures of 335 scholarships won by the grant-aided secondary schools, as against 254 won by the private schools, do not at all correspond with the distribution of highly intelligent children in the groups of population which use, or should have a chance of using, the two types of school. The analysis of scholarships at Cambridge, which follows, is an attempt to explain the comparative failure of the grant-aided schools.

### II. AN ANALYSIS OF SCHOLARSHIPS AT CAMBRIDGE

The object of this analysis was to discover whether a boy's chances of winning an open scholarship are noticeably affected by his choice of secondary school. Such a "choice" is seldom a free one, being determined usually by his parents' means, or by the locality in which he lives if he wins a free place.

*The Cambridge Review* publishes annually in January an analysis of the open scholarships won during the previous year, by subjects and by schools. The lists of schools winning scholarships are complete, but not always either quite clear or quite consistent. Since the names of the schools are not always given in full the identity of a school is sometimes doubtful: I have indicated below the seven cases in which I could not establish the identity of a school. Again, the totals given do not always tally with the lists: I have used the lists.

The figures which follow refer to the five years, December 1929 to December 1933.<sup>2</sup> Since there seems to be no differ-

<sup>1</sup> THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, April 1935, p. 149.

<sup>2</sup> *The Cambridge Review* for January 17, 1930; January 16; 1931, January 15, 1932; January 20, 1933; and January 19, 1934. In the first of these the scholarships are only those won in the previous December; in the remainder the figures refer to the whole of the previous year, and include some awarded on the results of the Higher Certificate.

## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

ence in kind, but only in degree, between scholarships and exhibitions, I have considered them all together and shall refer to them henceforward as scholarships. I found a total of 1,281<sup>1</sup> scholarships in the five years. Of these, 55 were won from schools outside England or from other universities, the remainder from schools in England. These 1,226 scholarships were divided between the State and private systems as follows:

193 grant-aided schools won 638 scholarships.  
79 private schools won 588 scholarships.

I thought it of value to compare the numbers of boys in each of the two types of schools with the numbers of scholarships won. Such a comparison will not bring out clearly any one factor, and in particular it must not be taken to reflect upon the teaching efficiency of the schools, since the age of leaving, home conditions, and other factors enter into it. But, whereas in the previous section I have shown the chances of scholarship-winning in two sections of the population, here we can get some indication of the relative chances of those who actually use the State secondary schools and those of secondary school age who are using the private schools.

In 1933 there were on the grant list 777 boys' and mixed schools in England, containing 211,739 boys.<sup>2</sup> From less than one-quarter of these schools were scholarships won at Cambridge in the previous five years; but, since all these schools are avenues to the universities, we must take all the boys into account. In five years, then, 638 scholarships were won from a group of schools which contained, in 1933, 211,739 boys—that is, one scholarship for every 332 boys.

Figures are difficult to obtain for the private schools, but a rough approximation can be made. The *Report on the Private Schools* (1932) gives 400,000 as the probable approximate total of children in such schools, about 350,000 of these

<sup>1</sup> Thirteen of these were noted as not being open. They constitute a small element of inaccuracy, since the college which awarded them was noted, but not the schools which won them.

<sup>2</sup> *Education in 1933*, pp. 131 and 134.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

being between 5 and 14 years old.<sup>1</sup> If we assume one-third of these latter to be between 11 and 14, and add the remaining 50,000, we get 166,666 children of secondary school age, of whom I took half to be boys. 588 scholarships divided between 83,333 boys gives one for every 142 boys, as compared with one for every 332 in the grant-aided schools.

These figures are admittedly very rough. The total given for the grant-aided schools contains several thousand boys who are under 11. On the other hand, the total for the private schools is probably also inflated, because a large number of those between 11 and 14 whom I have considered as secondary school boys are in schools of elementary type, and therefore are not strictly comparable with those in secondary schools in the State system; and because, owing to the movement from private schools to State secondary schools, which is considerable between the ages of 10 and 12, it is likely that less than one-third of those aged 5-14 in the private schools are contained in the age-group 11-14. It seems just, therefore, to say that the chances of winning a scholarship at Cambridge are at least twice as great for a boy of 11 who is destined to pass through the private school system, as for one whose way lies through the State schools.

Point is given to the contrast when we consider that we are comparing here, not two groups of the population differentiated merely by wealth, but two groups, one of which, using the private schools, contains all grades of ability in their natural distribution, and the other, using the State secondary schools, though it may contain all grades of ability, yet is, in the main, highly selective, through the operation of the "special place" examination.

Since we cannot assume that the occurrence of high ability in the wealthy classes is frequent enough to explain the discrepancy, we must search for other causes. I propose to examine five possible causes :

<sup>1</sup> P. 15.

## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

(a) Failure of the "special place" examination to select potential scholarship winners.

(b) Refusals, on the part of pupils or their parents, of "special places," and refusals to enter for the examination, where it is voluntary.

(c) Wastage during the secondary school course due to early leaving of able boys.

(d) The influence of home conditions.

(e) Defects in the teaching and organization of the State secondary school system.

It is convenient to take the last of these first, because the five-year figures of Cambridge scholarships throw light upon it.

### *(e) Defects in the Teaching and Organization of the State Secondary School System*

In almost every way, but particularly as the agents of selection for the universities, the grant-aided schools are of great variety. At one end of the scale is Manchester Grammar School, which wins nearly ten scholarships a year at Cambridge; at the other end are 584 schools, which, during the five years in question, won none. It is not simply a question of success and failure, since many schools do not set out to win university scholarships. There is a wide difference in aim between the schools which have large Sixth Forms, and a high leaving age, and those whose work usually ends with the School Certificate; or, again, between those with an agricultural or commercial bias and those which concentrate on pure scholarship. Amid this variety of differences I chose one factor which seemed to come nearest to differentiating those schools which consciously aim at a large connexion with the universities from those which do not.

Certain schools which can show a considerable number of boys working for the Higher Certificate are given a grant for recognized Advanced Courses. These are the schools which one would expect to have a large and active Sixth Form.



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

They are distinguished in the Board of Education's *List 60* (Secondary Schools recognized as efficient), of which I used the issue of 1932-3. On looking through this list, it seemed to me that there were so many good schools which had not recognized Advanced Courses that to make the possession of such a course a distinguishing mark would have little significance; but this expectation was belied by the figures which resulted from a separation of the schools with Advanced Courses from those without, in the investigation into the Cambridge scholarships.

Of the 777 boys' and mixed schools on the grant list, containing 211,739 boys, in 1933 there were 208, containing 87,862 boys, which had recognized Advanced Courses. In five years 490 scholarships were won from these schools, or one scholarship for every 179 boys in the group of schools. From the 569 remaining schools, containing 123,877 boys, 128 scholarships were won, or one scholarship for every 968 boys in the group of schools. These figures, with the figures for the private schools, are given in TABLE I, and in TABLE II I have set out the lists of scholarship-winning schools of the three types.

TABLE I  
SCHOLARSHIPS WON FROM THREE GROUPS OF SCHOOLS

	Number (Boys' and Mixed)	Pupils (Boys)	Scholarships	Boys in the group of schools per scholarship
(a) Schools on Grant List . . . . .	777	211,739	638	332
Those in (a) with Advanced Courses . . . . .	208	87,862	490 <sup>1</sup>	179
Those in (a) without Advanced Courses . . . . .	569	123,877	128 <sup>1</sup>	968
(b) Private Schools . . . . .	?	83,333	588	142

<sup>1</sup> Twenty scholarships were won from seven schools whose identity is uncertain. In the majority of cases there was confusion between two schools both of which are grant-aided, but only one of which has an Advanced Course. In two cases there seemed to be a misprint. I classed them all as grant-aided schools, but did not distinguish them as Advanced Course schools or otherwise. The following are the names as given and the scholarships won: Barrow (1), Hereford College (1), Ipswich (2), Latymer (13), Mile End Central (1), Rotherton Gr. (? Rotherham) (1), and Wednesday (? Wednesbury) (1).

# RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

TABLE II  
LISTS OF SCHOOLS WINNING SCHOLARSHIPS, IN THREE GROUPS

No.	Private Schools.	No.	Grant-aided Schools with Advanced Courses.	No.	Grant-aided Schools without Advanced Courses.
49	Marlborough.	47	Manchester Grammar School.		
36	St. Paul's.				
32	Eton.				
31	Winchester.				
30	Charterhouse.	28	King Edward's, Birmingham.		
27	Christ's Hospital.	24	Bradford Grammar School.		
21	City of London.				
19	Rugby,				
	Shrewsbury.	17	Liverpool College.		
17	Wellington,				
	Dulwich,				
	Cheltenham.				
16	Harrow.				
14	Stowe.				
13	Haileybury,	13	Bedford School,		
	Malvern, Oundle.		Nottingham High,		
			St. Olave's.		
12	Gresham's,	12	Battersea Grammar,		
	Highgate, Rossall.		Wolverhampton Grammar.		
11	Clifton.				
10	Uppingham.				
9	Repton.	9	Crypt, Gloucester.		
			King Edward, Stourbridge.		
8	Merchant Taylors,	8	Aske's,	8	Alleyn's.
	Tonbridge.		Sheffield Central,		
			Watford Grammar.		
7	Mill Hill,	7	Ald. Newton's,	7	Colchester R.
	Westminster.		Leicester,		Grammar.
			Blackburn Grammar,		
			Bolton,		
			King Edward VII,		
			Sheffield.		
6	2 schools.	6	8 schools.	6	1 school.
5	4 schools.	5	9 schools.	5	
4	5 schools.	4	11 schools.	4	2 schools.
3	3 schools.	3	11 schools.	3	5 schools.
2	9 schools.	2	23 schools.	2	13 schools.
1	29 schools.	1	25 schools.	1	58 schools.
0	?	0	96 schools.	0	481 schools.

20 scholarships won from 7 unidentified schools.

Before comparing schools on the basis of these figures, one thing should be made clear at the start. These are lists of

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

schools *from* which scholarships are won, not *by* which scholarships are won. It is true there are at the head of the lists a number of schools which one can speak of as scholarship-winning schools, or almost as scholarship factories, but at the bottom of the lists, if a school wins one scholarship at Cambridge in five years, one looks for an exceptional boy, not an exceptional school. If we take three scholarships in five years as the minimum standard for a scholarship-winning school, on the assumption that at least two important scholarships will be won elsewhere, bringing the total up to at least one a year, we find 41 scholarship-winning schools among the private schools, 57 among the grant-aided schools with Advanced Courses, and 10 among the grant-aided schools without Advanced Courses. What makes a school into a scholarship-winning school? Why, for instance, does University College School, with about 700 boys, win 2 scholarships in five years, while Marlborough, with about 750 boys, wins 49?

It seems, in this connexion, that there are two types of scholarship winners. The one, the lone thinker, contains within himself ambition and the ability to master a subject alone. Most teachers would agree, I think, that this type is most frequent amongst those with scientific or mathematical inclinations.<sup>1</sup> Such a boy will probably be successful from any type of school if he is allowed to remain at school long enough, and if the knowledge is within his reach. The other depends much more on the clash of his mind with others. He must have some sort of intellectual ferment around him, a scholarship atmosphere. For him the general level of culture of the school or the home is all-important. Though some of the 584 grant-aided schools which produced no scholarship winners at Cambridge in these five years must have produced some at Oxford, yet there is a large number of

<sup>1</sup> It is significant that more scholarships are awarded at Cambridge for Classics than for any other subject. Many of the smaller or more modern grant-aided schools are out of the running for these scholarships.

## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

schools which produced none at all, and it would be ridiculous to say that there were no potential scholarship winners in those schools, since the principle of selection for the secondary schools is primarily geographical. It is therefore not true to say that the scholarship system at Cambridge offers equal chances to all; some are more favoured by chance or by wealth, some are handicapped. The school to which a boy happens to go must in many cases greatly affect his chance of winning a scholarship.

A comparison between the private schools and the more successful group of the grant-aided schools, those with Advanced Courses, leaves it as a possibility that a boy would increase his chance of a scholarship by attending one of the former rather than one of the latter, since the rough figures I have given show one scholarship for every 142 boys in the former group, and one for every 179 in the latter, and this in spite of the fact that many of these Advanced Course schools are accustomed to take the very best of the talent from the large towns in which almost all of them are placed. It is unfortunately almost impossible to separate school from home circumstances in this comparison. On one hand we have a group of schools, nearly all of which are boarding-schools, home circumstances in the main comfortable and leisured if not necessarily cultured, and a tradition of scholarship and command which would naturally fire a boy's ambition; on the other a group of day-schools, with their accompaniment of waste of time in travelling, home circumstances which may be anything from the best to the most discouraging, and the tradition that if a career is to be made it means years of slogging hard work, and much pinching and scraping by both parents and boys. It is not equality of opportunity to offer prizes open to all at the end of a race, if the contestants have to run over different courses.

The recent decision with regard to State scholarships is interesting in this connexion. These, which were formerly limited to 300 and open only to pupils from State schools,

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

are now to be increased in number to 360, and thrown open to pupils from all secondary schools. The facile explanation that national scholarships should be competed for nationally, leaves out of account that these scholarships have previously been a compensation to pupils in the State schools for their lack of opportunities in other directions. The figures I have given lead one to the ironical conclusion that many more than the 60 extra scholarships will be won by pupils in the private schools, and the chances of poor pupils will thus be reduced.

To return to the Cambridge scholarships: the failure of the grant-aided schools to win scholarships in proportion to the size of the population group from which their pupils are drawn is clearly due, not so much to the comparative ill-success of the best of these schools when compared with the private schools, as to the complete un-success of so many of the smaller schools. Comparison between the two types of grant-aided school is fruitful because we are here comparing day-school with day-school, and the home circumstances of the pupils at the two types of school are similar. The figures which are the basis of the comparison are as follows:

*Advanced Course Schools.*—Out of 208 schools, with 87,862 boys, 105 schools won 490 scholarships.

*Schools without Advanced Courses.*—Out of 569 schools, with 123,877 boys, 81 schools won 128 scholarships (20 scholarships were won from 7 schools of doubtful identity).

Reference to these figures, and to the lists in TABLE II, shows that certain large schools, most of which are in large towns, have established a strong connexion with the older universities, and habitually win many scholarships, while at the great majority of grant-aided schools the scholarship-winner is a rare exception. This is a natural process. I have referred above to the great variety of the grant-aided secondary schools in aims, in facilities, and in the leaving age of the pupils, a variety which has arisen because of




## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

variety of needs. Yet while this differentiation has been going on, and while it has been recognized that a small country school must work under conditions quite different from those of a large town school, the function of providing an avenue to the university has been left to the secondary school *qua* secondary school, irrespective of other functions which are not compatible with it. And the recruitment of secondary school pupils has proceeded on the same assumption, that what was to be given was simply a secondary education, and not any particular kind of secondary education. (This is not true of some large towns, where schools like the Wyggeston at Leicester, or the Grammar School at Manchester, take the cream of the talent within reach, sometimes even from other secondary schools.) Thus the boy in a village or small town, whether he be a potential scholarship-winner or a boy of average intelligence who will go in for shop-keeping or farming, will, if he wins a "special place," have the Hobson's choice of one secondary school, a school-of-all-work which probably cannot give him what he needs.

The problem is thus essentially the same as that presented by the reorganization of elementary education, the problem of grouping similar children together when they are widely scattered geographically. But the secondary schools present a more difficult problem, because the numbers of pupils are smaller and the scattering consequently wider, so that a town large enough to reorganize its elementary education is still too small to have more than one secondary school. The accompanying map shows only part of the problem. I have plotted on it all the boys' and mixed secondary schools with Advanced Courses in England, and shaded the areas which are not within twenty miles of such a school. The shaded areas include large parts of the thinly populated north and south-west, but they also include much of Lincolnshire and East Anglia, and some of the thickly populated Sussex coast. Again, twenty miles is an extreme distance for going to school, and the map cannot show the large areas where

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

**MAP I.  
DISTRIBUTION OF  
ADVANCED-COURSE  
SCHOOLS FOR BOYS**



# RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

MAP II  
DISTRIBUTION OF  
SCHOLARSHIP -  
WINNING SCHOOLS.



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

a small neighbouring secondary school is the only one to which a "special place" entitles boys to go.

MAP II shows the distribution of the scholarship-winning grant-aided schools (i.e. those from which three or more scholarships were won at Cambridge in the five years under review). The shaded areas again show the parts of the country out of reach of such schools. Much of the shaded area in the southern counties may be due to the proximity of Oxford, but in general the map emphasizes the deficiencies shown in MAP I. It is noteworthy that not one of the eight schools with Advanced Courses in the distressed area of Durham appears amongst these scholarship-winning schools.

In order that the secondary school system should properly fulfil its function as the means for the selection and training of the best brains of the nation, it seems to be necessary that the grading of schools, which has so far proceeded haphazard in response to need in each locality, should be done consciously and nationally, with provision for the concentration of certain types of boys in suitable secondary schools. It is disquieting that not only is this not being done, but the opposite seems to be taking place, a tendency towards the grading down of secondary schools to the level of the re-organized Central or Senior schools, without provision for the cleverer pupils.

To introduce technical or commercial subjects into a secondary school curriculum, in order to bring the school into closer contact with modern industry, may be beneficial. But if it is done in the only secondary school of a district, and if it impairs the more scholarly parts of the curriculum or draws into industry at an early age boys who are capable of a university career, it is undemocratic and is likely to benefit the future employer rather than the school and its pupils.

Another recent movement is that for the introduction of large "multiple-bias" schools, on the American model, in which the secondary course would be only one of a number

## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

of courses in a kind of vast Senior school. There seems to be no reason to suppose that such schools would make any contribution to the solution of the scholarship problem. Though they would make the selection of children for different courses easier, since it could be done at a later age, they would not solve the problem of transport, and consequently they would not achieve the grouping of children of first-rate intelligence in large enough numbers to make possible the cultivation of a good Sixth Form and a scholarship atmosphere.

The "multiple-bias" school has been defended on the ground that it is democratic, that it gets rid of the social distinction between various kinds of post-primary education. Yet even its defenders would retain in addition certain technical schools for those of specialized ability; and it is difficult to understand why, if special schools for the technically-minded are in accordance with democratic principles, special schools for the intellectually-minded are not. What matters, surely, is not the existence of special facilities, but the equalizing of the opportunities of using them. If, as Mr. F. S. Marvin says,<sup>1</sup> "it cannot be said that on the whole the moral sense of the nation is revolted by" the inequalities which the Public School system involves, it seems unlikely that it would boggle at schools for the clever if they were open to all who could make use of them. We may leave the last word on this subject to Professor Tawney.

"The more anxiously, indeed, a society endeavours to secure equality of consideration for all its members, the greater will be the differentiation of treatment which, when once their common human needs have been met, it accords to the special needs of different groups and individuals among them."<sup>2</sup>

If, on the grounds both of social justice and of national expediency in turning all the best intellects to the best account, we accept the principle of the graded secondary

<sup>1</sup> *The Nation at School*, Oxford University Press, 1933, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> *Equality*, Allen & Unwin, 1931, p. 52.



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

school, it seems that, though the problem of grading may be solved by day-schools in the large towns, over the country as a whole the difficulty of transport will make boarding-schools necessary, either new State boarding-schools or the existing schools remodelled. But before discussing this further it is convenient to examine the reasons, other than inadequate grading of schools, for the failure of the grant-aided secondary schools to produce enough winners of open scholarships.

### (a) *Failure of the "Special Place" Examination to Select Potential Scholarship Winners*

Although this examination has been severely criticized, the criticism has been mainly on the ground that it is insufficiently selective in border-line cases, where the candidates bunch thickly round the pass line. There have been cases where candidates from poor country schools, placed low in the examination, have gone on to gain honours in School Certificate,<sup>1</sup> but the ability required for an open scholarship is so high that it can scarcely be missed in a qualifying examination such as that for "special places." We may rule out this examination as a serious cause of the failure of the grant-aided secondary schools to win enough open scholarships. That is not to say, however, that it would be adequate to select pupils for a graded system of secondary schools, and it is probable that for this purpose the final grading would have to take place at a later age, say 13 or 14, or after the School Certificate Examination.

### (b) *Refusal of "Special Places," and Refusal to Enter for the "Special Place" Examination*

We are here on uncertain ground, since we are dealing with a group of pupils whose capacities are unknown, because they have been denied the possibility of a secondary educa-

<sup>1</sup> *The Reliability of Examinations: An Enquiry*, C. W. Valentine and W. G. Emmett. University of London Press, 1932, p. 32.

## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

tion, and since there are no figures which show the extent of these refusals over the whole country.

The results of the latest enquiry of the Board of Education into this matter were published in 1928 (*Memorandum on Examinations for Scholarships and Free Places in Secondary Schools*). At this time in only 45 out of 75 areas investigated was the examination compulsory; where the examination was not compulsory usually less than 20 per cent. of the age-group were entered. The Memorandum states (p. 22) that the widening of the field in a compulsory examination "results in the actual offer of free secondary education to many fit candidates who would not voluntarily have competed." There has been much improvement since 1928, but there are still many areas where the examination is not compulsory.

After a compulsory examination, and sometimes after a voluntary examination, many "special places" are refused. In *Social Progress and Educational Waste* (Routledge, 1926), Mr. K. Lindsay showed that in Bradford up to 1926 the refusals exceeded the acceptances, and included 50 per cent. of the first 200 on the list (p. 11), while in London there were about 60 refusals due to poverty in each of the three years prior to 1926 (p. 39). The position at the present day seems to be only slightly improved. I have obtained sample figures from six authorities, which I give in full here. Owing to differing methods of conducting the examination, it is impossible to tabulate the figures.

In Bradford (County Borough) the examination is compulsory, and is taken by all children between 10 and 12 who have reached Standard IV. In 1934 there were 4,874 candidates, 3,078 "special places" at secondary schools were offered, and 2,030 were refused. In commenting on these extraordinary figures it must be remembered that the facilities for secondary education in Bradford are very large, and therefore one would expect more refusals than in most districts. Again, many children take the examination twice

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

and may accept at the second time. Nevertheless, in giving me the information, the Authority stated that many children refuse twice.

In London (County Council) there are two examinations for Junior County Scholarships. The preliminary examination is compulsory for all in the age-group, and all who pass take the final examination. For the last thirteen years between 91 and 92 per cent. of awards have been taken up each year, and the majority of those not taken up are stated to be due to the parents' being ineligible under the income limits. The figures of refusals in 1933 are as follows :

Junior County Scholarships awarded, 1,937. Refused, 26 (1·3 per cent.).  
Supplementary Scholarships awarded, 521. Refused, 13 (2·5 per cent.).

These figures do not take into account the many scholarships offered by secondary schools and from other sources, and are not comparable with the Bradford figures.

In East Ham (County Borough) the examination is voluntary. About 900 out of an age-group of 2,300 sit, 270 "special places" are offered, and there are generally no refusals.

In Blackburn (County Borough) the examination is compulsory. In 1933 there were 113 offers of "special places" and 5 refusals (4·4 per cent.).

In Scarborough (Borough) the examination is voluntary. Fifty "special places" were offered in 1934 and there were 4 refusals (8·0 per cent.).

In the West Riding (County Council) there is a preliminary examination in the elementary schools. Heads of schools then recommend candidates for the examination proper. In 1933 87·6 per cent. of the age-group 10-12 took the preliminary test; 33·6 per cent. of these were recommended for the examination; and 8·6 per cent. of these latter did not enter for it (in 1934 the figure was 10·1 per cent.). The Education Committee, on page 3 of its report on the examination in 1933, says: "It is unsatisfactory that

## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

so many recommended children were not allowed to take their chance of obtaining an award." But the position is made worse by refusals of awards after the examination, which have amounted to between 5 and  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of offers over the last few years. In 1933, out of 2,179 "special places" offered, 139 were refused (6.4 per cent.).

These sample figures are enough to show that in many parts of the country refusals of facilities for secondary education present a serious problem, and affect a considerable number of children. Although it is frequently said, for the sake of brevity, that the children have refused the awards, we cannot consider a child of eleven to be capable of making such a decision intelligently. The refusals are in fact made by the parents on behalf of the children, and there seems to be little doubt that most of them are made for economic reasons. Without greater knowledge, it is impossible to say how many, if any, potential scholars lose their chance of secondary education in this way, but the position is not satisfactory while we cannot be certain that none do. In general, these refusals illustrate one of the weaknesses of the State secondary schools, as compared with the private schools. Since their pupils come usually from poorer homes, the possibilities of the diversion of high talent into immediate employment are much greater. There is no doubt that the obligation to keep children at a secondary school till the age of 16, and so lose two years' wages, causes many parents to refuse "special places." Maintenance grants are not yet sufficiently developed to offset this tendency. If the university should be the goal of the highest talents in the community, the reaching of the goal necessitates co-operation by the State, the schools, the pupils, and the parents. It is pitiable that in the present situation many parents, even those who are willing to make sacrifices, regard the goal as economically unattainable for their children, while the children themselves, diverted at the age of 11, do not even see the goal.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

### (c) *Wastage during the Secondary School Course due to Early Leaving of Able Boys*

This is a second stage of the problem which I referred to at the end of the previous section. The secondary school offers an easy entry into offices and shops at about the age of 16, and it is used by many parents for this purpose. The following figures show the extent of wastage before the School Certificate examination is taken. They are taken from Mr. W. A. Brockington's *A Secondary School Entrance Test* (Oxford University Press, 1934, pp. 34, 35), and show the percentage of those entering secondary schools who sit for School Certificate five years later, (1) in the country as a whole, all pupils, and (2) in the area Mr. Brockington is investigating, free-place pupils only.<sup>1</sup>

Year.	(1)	(2)	
1929	56.0	47.6	per cent. of the entries of five years previously sitting for School Certificate.
1930	58.2	45.1	
1931	60.6	56.8	
1932	63.7	61.1	
1933	—	56.6	

By reducing the sacrifice necessary to keep a child at a secondary school, a general raising of the school-leaving age would, as Mr. Brockington says,<sup>2</sup> "make the grammar school a more eclectic type of secondary education than it is at present," but leaving at the age of 16 or soon after would still present a problem as far as the recruitment of future university scholars is concerned. How great this problem is is shown by the figures of school leavers. On March 31, 1933, the numbers of boys over 15 at grant-aided secondary schools in England and Wales were as follows<sup>3</sup>:

<sup>1</sup> The two sets of figures are not comparable with one another because the nature of the parents' obligation differs from area to area.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> *Education in 1933*, p. 133.



## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

Age.						
15-16	.	.	.	.	.	31,356
16-17	.	.	.	.	.	23,840
17-18	.	.	.	.	.	12,103
18-19	.	.	.	.	.	5,798
Over 19	.	.	.	.	.	2,356

These figures again raise the question of the organization of the secondary school system. Though headmasters usually make every effort to keep clever boys at school, the decision to stay on after the age of 17 must rest with the ambition of the boys themselves and the ambition and means of their parents. If the boy is at a school which can offer little in the way of Sixth Form work or of prospects of a university scholarship, it is only ambition of an exceptional order which can resist the prospect of immediate employment. Though the parents may be willing, many boys are unwilling to demand a great sacrifice of their parents. Transference of able boys to a kind of higher-grade secondary school, even after the School Certificate is taken, would enable them to see clearly their way to the university and so act as a spur to ambition.

### *(d) The Influence of Home Conditions*

I have dealt, to some extent, with this problem by implication in the preceding sections. Too much is made of the instances, not so rare as they used to be but still too rare, of boys from the humblest homes fighting their way to the university. We should be passing out of the time when such feats arouse surprise and admiration. In a democratic society they should be taken as a matter of course. Though facilities exist by which the humblest boy can make a great career for himself, there is no general feeling in this country of complete freedom of movement in society. Parents are too often content with one step up in the social scale for their children. The ambition of the manual worker is to make his son a clerk. During a recent investigation, on the spot, into Russian education, I was struck by the amount of energy

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

which is unleashed by the feeling that all things are possible for all men, if only they have the necessary ability and capacity for hard work. This feeling is in part due, no doubt, to the period of intense constructive activity through which Russia is passing, but it is also partly due to a system of education which not only opens the career to talent but makes it obvious that it is so open. There is no such feeling in England. Instead, we have the belief among the wealthier classes that entry into certain occupations is derogatory, whilst among the poorer classes to try to get their sons into the higher professions is considered a solecism and a thing too risky to attempt. There are certain notable exceptions. Teaching is an open profession because the State has interested itself financially in recruitment. The same is true of the ministries of some religious bodies, where recruiting also has to be encouraged. In these two professions we may see a return to the system of the mediæval Church, which opened opportunities in education to all because it needed recruits. Other professions, already adequately staffed, have not yet opened their doors. It remains to be seen whether what has been done as the result of necessity in some walks of life can be done as a matter of social justice in others.

### CONCLUSION

At all stages in the progress towards the winning of a university scholarship, over almost the whole country boys in the State schools are at a disadvantage compared with those using the private school system. The disadvantages can be divided roughly into two groups: first, those connected with the organization of the State secondary school system, including particularly the lack of grouping and the element of chance as to whether a boy goes to a scholarship-winning school or not; secondly, those connected with the family, including difficult home circumstances and the lack of the feeling that the career is really open to talent.

There is reason for thinking that both these sets of dis-

## RECRUITMENT OF THE NATION'S LEADERS

advantages could be much reduced by a reorganization of secondary education which would include: (1) the grouping of clever pupils in schools which would have a large and active Sixth Form, (2) the transference to these schools of pupils from other schools at the age of 13-14 or after taking School Certificate, and (3) the use of boarding-schools to make the grouping possible outside the big towns. In this way the avenue to the universities would become more open and more obvious, and ambition would be stirred by seeing the next step always ahead. Such a reorganization would abolish the no-man's-land which exists in many secondary schools, containing pupils who have passed School Certificate and who are doubtful whether to snatch at the first job that offers or to stay at school and try for something better. Those who intended, and who were able, to go into the higher schools would make the decision and be transferred. For those who remained in their own schools it would be the opportunity for courses in that practical, technical, or business training about which so much is heard at present. There would be opposition from the schools which were to be decapitated, just as there was opposition to reorganization in the elementary schools, but there seems to be little doubt that reorganization in that sphere has benefited the children.

The crux of the matter is the provision of boarding-schools. We may, I think, rule out State boarding-schools as unlikely to be financially possible for many years. We are left with the alternative of using the present schools. Two famous headmasters, Dr. Norwood, late of Harrow,<sup>1</sup> and Mr. J. F. Roxburgh, of Stowe,<sup>2</sup> have advocated the entry of free-place pupils into the Public Schools. There would be difficulties of curriculum, but these could be surmounted if a scheme were seriously intended. The chief difficulty would be finance. Both the headmasters envisage a scheme of State bursaries, which, if the scheme were large enough to be of

<sup>1</sup> In *The Schools of England*, edited by Dover Wilson, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1928, p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> *Eleutheros: The Future of the Public Schools*, Kegan Paul, pp. 81-2.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

much use, would be nearly as expensive as State boarding-schools. The alternative to this seems to be an enquiry into and a redistribution of endowments, such as was undertaken as a result of the Endowed Schools Act of 1869. All that I have said in these two papers seems to lead to the conclusion that the endowments of most of the private schools are the endowment of privilege, and it may be that we are reaching a time when the endowment of privilege in education will be considered less desirable than the endowment of equal opportunity.

There is, finally, a social argument for a scheme which would bring the private schools within the State's system. Such a scheme would help to bring about sympathy between social classes, and a sense of unity in the nation which is now absent. Without such a scheme, it might be that the nation would continue not to be revolted by the inequalities involved in the private school system; but it seems more probable that a struggle would develop in which the private schools might be abolished or so changed that what there is of value in their tradition, instead of being allowed to influence the other secondary schools, as it has already done with great benefit, would be lost altogether.

## AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

*By* A. B. GOUGH

**I**F we compare the vast expansion of historical studies in recent times with that of the natural sciences, we are struck by a profound difference. While specialization necessarily reigns in both, the effort to generalize—to determine universal laws—in history is slight (though important progress has been made), compared with what has been achieved in the study of Nature. This is inevitable, for history is the sphere of the incalculable, self-determined human will. Yet we are learning—in psychology, physiology, climatology, economics, and other sciences—to find unsuspected limits imposed on man's freedom, though they need not discredit the conviction that ultimately the will is free. The knowledge of these limits may indeed, and already does, give new opportunities to effort, and thereby promotes man's power over Nature.

The specialists have now surveyed so wide a territory, stored with so immense a mass of often very loosely co-ordinated facts, that comparative studies are attracting increasing attention. Among these, attempts to formulate an ideal scheme of development for societies or culture-systems are naturally and rightly viewed by professed historians with misgiving, not only because they usually break down, but still more because of the extreme complexity of history, and the interaction of innumerable factors, known and unknown. Conceivably, however, amid the chaotic agitation of the ocean of world-history, it may be possible to detect a rhythmic ground-swell, obscured and often obliterated by the conflicting currents and eddying winds of circumstance.

Even a fully equipped historian could hardly hope to discover such a principle by purely inductive methods. If I may hope to escape the charge of presumptuous sciolism, it is only because my hypothesis was conceived in essentials



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

at the outset, and gradually modified by a series of empirical tests, until an approximation was reached which I humbly suggest may offer a *prima facie* case for investigation.

Throughout the enquiry I have been specially on my guard against the notorious tendency to believe too readily that one has found the evidence for which one is looking. The valuation of the data, especially cultural data, involves personal judgment, and with it bias. It is therefore best to abide by accepted standards, even though many may be merely conventional, hoping that the cumulative result may disclose something significant.

Periodicity in history may be understood in several ways : (1) The earth as a whole may be thought to pass through cycles of change, as in some Indian, Greek, and other ancient systems (cf. Nietzsche). (2) It may be thought that every nation, empire, or culture-system goes through a similar cycle of growth and decay, recurring with modifications after a definite period (Vico, Spengler). (3) Periodicity may be conceived as consisting in the passing round the earth of rhythmical waves or tides, stimulating and depressing the energy of the inhabitants.

It is the third of these possibilities with which I am concerned. My attention was drawn to it by lighting on an old article in *ZS. des kgl. preussischen statistischen Bureaus*, 19 Jg., Berlin, 1879, pp. 21-26, by Ernst Sasse, who maintained that a rhythmical westward movement is perceptible. I am not aware that the idea has been pursued farther, but it seemed to be worth examination, and the sceptical reserve with which I began the enquiry (which I have carried on at intervals through many years) has yielded to a growing conviction that it has a solid basis.

Such a movement, if it exists, can only be one factor among many, and its importance may be slight or profound. The existence of numerous exceptions need be no objection, provided that the instances which support the theory are too many to be explicable by chance or self-deception. The

## AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

method must therefore be statistical. If there are such waves as I suggest, it may be assumed that they are of physical origin, and hence capable of mathematical formulation. Possible distortion may be ignored in this enquiry.

A wave-crest being a line and not an area, the units which provide the data cannot be culture-systems or large countries, but small centres of activity, such as cities. Where movements of thought or action sweep wide areas, the foci must be considered. The data must be gathered from every age for which the chronology can be approximately fixed, and from every region in which social and mental change can be recorded, however insignificant from the standpoint of world-history. Complete isolation is no bar. Migrations and the spatial transmission of ideas need not be involved. The analogy of the tides, which consist primarily of the continuous dislocation of a vertical movement, may help. It is essential to remember that it is not the general progress of the race that is to be considered, but the vicissitudes in each local community, from Athens or Florence to some obscure Bantu people or Pacific island. Further, the general cultural standard of the age must be the background. The Dark Ages of Europe supply many instances of local stimulus, absolutely low, but relatively high.

The most convenient moments to choose for tabulation are those of the greatest visible energy in the community, as far as possible those preceded by ages of constructive activity and followed by ages of decline,<sup>1</sup> for there may be many lesser fluctuations. Contemporary or very recent events are best omitted.

These moments of maximal energy, or culminations, are more easily recognized than defined. They vary immensely in character, according to the capacities, opportunities, and environment of the community. For the assumed stimulus may affect savage, barbaric, or civilized peoples at any stage

<sup>1</sup> I therefore reject the epochs of David and Solomon, and of Queen Elizabeth, as exceptionally brilliant initial outbursts, following times of decline.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

of their secular development. At the lowest stage there may be little more than a tendency to forcible unification or aggression under a leader of genius, like the Zulu Chaka; at the highest there may be many-sided feverish activity. The culmination in this sense is the time immediately preceding the first evident signs of decay, the time when disruptive tendencies in the polity are still held in check, when expansion and aggression, or it may be the struggle against superior force, are at their height, when the intellect is still creative, and the arts exhibit the greatest splendour and technical skill, though they may have lost their spiritual exaltation. It is essentially a time of pride and glory, when the community is neither straining forward to further achievement, nor looking back regretfully. There is reason to believe, as we shall see later, that this ostensible peak is not the moment of highest vitality, but rather the time when the work of more strenuous single-hearted earlier generations bears visible fruit, though incipient decay lurks beneath the surface. Indeed, in some of these Golden Ages, as in that of Leo X, the germs of decay are already obvious. Triumphant militarism is not a criterion of inner vitality, but from its almost universal appearance at some stage in a nation's life, and the frequency with which it is followed by disaster, it marks a turning-point which can be determined more easily than the more elusive moment of the highest æsthetic and moral greatness, which, moreover, presents a problem in which subjective judgment and bias are certain to be involved. I accept Prof. Toynbee's observation that the spatial expansion of a civilization is generally accompanied by the deterioration of culture.<sup>1</sup> But in a great many cases an age of great political and military activity is also one of exceptional intellectual stir and unrest, and of artistic magnificence, e.g. in architecture; in short, what historians are wont to describe as the zenith of civiliza-

<sup>1</sup> *A Study of History*, 1935, iii, pp. 140-156. Note that the centre of expansion, e.g. Pella, Berlin, may be remote from, and in my view may culminate later than, the cultural centre, e.g. Athens, Frankfort.

## AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

tion—a greatness which is possibly not so much qualitative as quantitative.

The religious crisis occurs definitely earlier. Thus we find: Elijah—Deutero-Isaiah; Zoroaster—the Medo-Persian empire; Buddha and Mahavira—Asoka; the Orphic teachers—Pericles and Alexander; Confucius and Lao-tse—Shī Hwang-ti; St. Paul and the Churches of Antioch and Asia Minor—the culture of Antioch and the Syrian and Cappadocian schools; St. Francis—the Tuscan Renaissance; Luther—Goethe and nineteenth-century Middle Germany; Calvin and the Huguenots—Revolutionary and Napoleonic North France; the English Puritans—Modern England.<sup>1</sup> As the culmination approaches, religious fervour is transmuted into systems of theology or philosophy.

In collecting instances of culmination as described above, selection is dangerous, as it inevitably admits bias. I have therefore included in my list many doubtful instances, preferring unwieldiness, and the probable obscuration of the evidence, to the risk of arbitrary selection. Economic history has perforce been ignored, partly through ignorance of that science, partly because so little is known of the factor in many countries for long stretches of time. This will be thought a grave flaw, but it need not vitiate a cumulative argument, and there may even be an advantage in disregarding a factor so largely dependent on special, non-universal causes, such as natural resources and the control of markets.

The grouping of eminent persons according to the time and place of birth was found useful for discovering local maxima.

Before proceeding to the table of culminations, something should be said about the formulation of the hypothesis, which, as already stated, was reached at an early stage. Among the outstanding examples of maximal energy it was observed that (a) there was a tendency for the centres of activity to move westward, but that (b) in the northern hemisphere the more

<sup>1</sup> Islam appears to be an exception; but Mecca and Medina decayed through the emigration to more favoured regions, as Iraq, where culture culminated after an interval

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

northern centres tended to lag behind the more southern, and that (c) the interval between two such series of pulsations averaged about 850 years. This suggested the westward movement of a succession of waves with oblique crests, and this again suggested an equatorial axis, and a crest curving




FIG.1. THE THREE HYPOTHETICAL WAVES.-----

back in a north-eastern and south-eastern direction from a vertex on the Equator (see Fig. 1). Instances from the southern hemisphere corroborated this assumption. The mean velocity calculated for the motion indicated that to give intervals of c. 850 years, there could only be three equidistant waves, all attempts to formulate a system with one, two, or four being



## AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

fruitless. Again, the presumed form of these waves suggested a relation to the velocity at different latitudes of the earth's daily rotation. This corresponds to the length of the degree of longitude, and can be found from the cosine of the latitude. After trials with various constants and wave-periods, a formula for determining the ideal maximum dates for any given place was found, which could be provisionally accepted.

To find the ideal dates of culmination  $x$ , let  $L$  be the latitude, and  $M$  (or  $-M$  if west of Greenwich) the longitude. Then if each of the three waves moves one-third round the earth in 850 years, it moves  $1^\circ$  of latitude in  $7.08\bar{3}$  years. The crest is estimated to pass the meridian of Greenwich on the equator ( $0^\circ-0^\circ$ ) in 843 B.C., A.D. 7, etc., and will therefore pass the same meridian N. or S. at later dates, the difference being proportional to  $1 - \cos L$ . The coefficient 2,980 is found to give approximately the required gradient of the wave-crest. We thus obtain the empirical formula

$$x = 7 \pm 850n + 2,980 (1 - \cos L) - 7.08\bar{3} M.$$

This formula was tested by applying it to a list of culminations of energy, as defined above, drawn from summaries which I made of the history of between two and three hundred regions. Of these culminations 467 were noted, but 32 were rejected as too vague or too recent. The others were divided into four classes according to their importance, and weighted accordingly. The 74 instances in Class A count eight each, the 204 in Class B four each, the 96 in Class C two each, and the 61 in Class D one each. If it is preferred to ignore the weighting as an arbitrary device, the results are very similar. For convenience' sake the hypothetical cycle is divided into 25 sections ( $a, b, c \dots y$ ) of 34 years each, and each culmination is assigned to one or more of these, fractional numbers indicating overlapping, as  $l.2, m.3, n.5$ . As the whole theory must stand or fall with the degree of impartiality and sound judgment shown in the list of culminations, it is necessary to give the reader such an opportunity of criticism as the limits of this article allow. Accordingly a bare list follows of the in-

WAVE I			WAVE II			WAVE III		
Early (a-m)	Peak (n-p)	Late (q-y)	Early	Peak	Late	Early	Peak	Late
						1944-01. BABY- LON: Kham- murabi.	1580-40. Baby- lon: Kassites. 1485-47. Egypt: Thothmes iii, etc. 1450-1350. Crete: LM ii. 1375. Mitanni. 1300-1250. Ar- golis. 1270. Hittites. 1230-1196. Sar- dis, Tyrrha, Sagalassos. 1190. Troy.	1110-1100. As- syria: Tiglath- pileser i.
782-36. Israel and Judah.	1062-42. Wei- ho: Ch'ou.							
702-01. Phœ- nicia: Luli ix.	743-17. Elam. 732-09. Chal- deans (Bit- Yâkin, etc.).	728. Nubia; Pi- ankhi i.						
680-45. Urtu. 669-642. As- syria: Ashur- banipal.	651-604. Lower Egypt: Saïtes. 640-08. Judah: culture. 606-584. Media: Cyaxares.	588. BABYLON.						
	590. Tyre. 575-30. Cyren- aica.							



Wave I			Wave II			Wave III		
Early (a-m)	Peak (n-p)	Late (q-y)	Early	Peak	Late	Early	Peak	Late
8 B.C.-A.D. 17. Marcomanni.	A.D. 20-50. Quadi.	86-107. Dacia.	66-135. Judea.	123-153. BAC- TRIA: Kanish- ka. 148-62. Sel- eucia: Volo- gases iii.		113-38. W. Deccan: W. Andhras.		
90. Cherusci. 110. Chauci.	100-167. Chatti. 150. Hermun- duri.			215. Roman Egypt.	240-71. Persia: Shapur i.			
	296-325. Roman Britain.	286-314. Ar- menia: Tiri- dates iii.		262-72. Palmyra.			320-40. S. India: Pallavas. 329-57. Ceylon.	
	379-406. Meath: Niall. 420-60. Strath- clyde.			300-50. Anti- och: culture.		326-413. Mid- Ganges: Gup- tas.	424-50. NAN- KING: Sung. 474-80. Orissa.	
			520-40. Raven- na. 567-653. Gothic Spain.	360-400. Cappa- docia: culture. 446-484. Geor- gia. 527-60. BYZAN- TIUM: Justinian. 590-690. Rome: Gregory, etc.		525-71. Abye- sinia. 531-79. CENT. PERSIA: Khus- rau i.	528-40. Bihar & Malwa. 550-600. S.W. Korea: Hiak- sal. 606-48. UPPER GANGES: Harsha. 605-80. Yemen.	
								608-42. N.W. DECCAN: Cha- lukyas. 628-49. MID. HWANGHO.





WAVE I			WAVE II			WAVE III		
Early (a-m)	Peak (n-p)	Late (q-y)	Early	Peak	Late	Early	Peak	Late
				987-996. Île de France.			996-1029. Egypt: El-Hakim, etc.	997-1030. Ghazni.
1040. Malwa; Bhoja.				992-1025. Poland: Boleslav ii.	994-1100. YUGA-TAN.			
				1010-73. Saxony.			1020-30. KHU-RASAN: culture.	
				1042-70. NORMANDY.			1054-60. Ghana.	
1060-85. Pagán.			1045-66. Mecklenburg; Obotrites.				1063-72. W. Turkistan; Seljuqs.	
			1064-1119. S. Ireland.			1105-54. Sicily: Roger ii.		
1076-1126. Cent. Deccan: Chaklukyas.	1120-65. Carnatic: Chola, etc.			1125-81. N. Saxony.		1106-1200. Morocco: Almohads & Almohads.		
	1153-86. Ceylon: Parakrama.				1136-54. Anjou.		1127-45. Mosul.	
	1150-60. N. Siam: Thai.							1171-93. Kurdistan.
	1150-1200. Fuhkien: culture.			1140-1230. N.W. Germany.	1152-1212. Suzdal-Rostov.		1172-1218. Khiva.	
				1166-1250. N. Ireland.	1160-1230. Austria, SUABIA.			1174-86. Ghor.
				1170-1237. N. Wales.				
				1180-85. S. Wales.	1198-1240. Lombodmeria.			
				1202-25. DENMARK: Valdemar ii.	1264-98. ENGLAND.	1200-00. LANCUEDEG.		
						1212-23. Georgia.		
				1217-40. Novgorod & Pskov.		1218-41. Bulgaria-Vlachs.		
	1223-50. S. Decan: Hoysala.							

1223-30. S. Decan: Hoysala. 1225-56. HANG-CHAU: S. Sung. 1250. Orissa. 1246-60. JAPAN.	1217-40. Novgorod & Pskov. 1240-70. Norway. 1245-50. Viaby. 1263-96. Scottish Lowlands. 1275-93. Sweden.	1264-98. ENGLAND. 1226-70. N. FRANCE: St. Louis. 1260-76. Bohemia: Ottakar. 1280-1337. Holland. 1345. Flanders. 1350. Lübeck, etc.: Hansa.	1212-23. Georgia. 1218-41. Bulgaria-Vlachs.	1219-39. KONIA: Seljuqs. 1360-77. Egypt: Bibars. 1311-31. Melle. 1337-59. Morocco: Merinids. 1359-89. Brusa: Ottomans. 1359-1401. Tunis & Tlemcen. 1369-1405. KESH: Timur.
1297-1311. Delhi: Ala-ud-din Khilji. 1300. Maharashtra. 1343-1409. Pandua (Bengal). 1386-1429. Nepal. 1400-20. Seoul: Ni Tai-jo. 1400-41. Jaunpur, etc. 1403-49. Ming. HWANG-HO: 1 Yung-lo, Chêng-tung. 1405-60. Malwa: Moslems. 1417-67. Kashmir. 1439-40. Oudh.	1344-57. Siam: Rama Thibodi. 1368-98. Nan-king: Hung-wu (Ming). 1397-1422. KULBARGA: Bahmanis. 1395-1405. Majapahit (Java).		1331-58. Serbia: Dushan. 1351-91. Bosnia. 1424-69. Bohemia.	1416-42. Sicily: Alfonso V. 1490. Ecuador: Cara.

1 Centre of Ming power and culture, between the two capitals.

WAVE I			WAVE II			WAVE III		
Early (a-m)	Peak (n-p)	Late (q-y)	Early	Peak	Late	Early	Peak	Late
	1424-1500: Ahmadabad, culture & power.					1430-86. Mexico: Aztecs.	1430-95. Cuzco: Incas.	
	1484-1526. Senar: Funj.					1450-66. Milan: F. Sforza.	1440-50. Granada, Malaga.	
						1458-1504. Moldavia: Stephen.	1440-94. Naples.	
						1466-77. Burgundy: Charles the Bold.	1444-66. Albania: Scanderbeg.	
						1475-1513. Switzerland.	1451-81. Adrianople: Muhammad ii.	
						1481-5. Hungary: Matthias i.	1453-1526. Ragusa.	
						1487-1534. Siena & Perugia.		1490-1520. Bogotá: Chibcha.
						1492-1524. Guatemala.		
	1500. Kilwa, etc.: Zenj.					1500-30. Nuremberg.	1510-60. Portugal.	
1520-84. Songhai.		1520. Vijayanagara.				1503-8. Venice.	1513-50. Rome.	
			1521. N. Borneo: Brunei.				1516-70. Cent. Spain.	
								STANTINOPLE; Suleiman i.

1516-70. CENT. SPAIN.	1530-37. FLO- RENCE.	1540-44. Pegu.	1540-47. Humayun and Sher Shah.	1516-70. CENT. SPAIN.	1530-37. FLO- RENCE.	1540-44. Pegu.	1540-47. Humayun and Sher Shah.	1516-70. CENT. SPAIN.
1593-1601. Wallachia.	1540. Genoa. 1548-1606. Po- LAND. 1570. Lombardy.	1540-44. Pegu.	1556-1600. PAN- JAB: Akbar.	1593-1601. Wallachia.	1540. Genoa. 1548-1606. Po- LAND. 1570. Lombardy.	1540-44. Pegu.	1556-1600. PAN- JAB: Akbar.	1593-1601. Wallachia.
1604-71. Don Cossacks.	1613-48. Tran- sylvania. 1620-60. S. France.	1607-36. Achin.	1600. Congo. 1596-1637. Dar Fur.	1604-71. Don Cossacks.	1613-48. Tran- sylvania. 1620-60. S. France.	1607-36. Achin.	1600. Congo. 1596-1637. Dar Fur.	1604-71. Don Cossacks.
	1648-53. Zapo- rozhan Cos- sacks. 1689. Hungary. 1690-1750. Pied- mont-Savoy.	1661-1721. Pe- KINO: K'ang- hsi.	1650. Benin.		1648-53. Zapo- rozhan Cos- sacks. 1689. Hungary. 1690-1750. Pied- mont-Savoy.	1661-1721. Pe- KINO: K'ang- hsi.	1650. Benin.	
	1730-5. AUSTRIA.	1740-61. Mah- rattas. 1753-1819. Bur- ma: Alom- pra, etc.	1722-5. S.E. Af- ghanistan: Ghilzai. 1730. Hausa.		1730-5. AUSTRIA.	1740-61. Mah- rattas. 1753-1819. Bur- ma: Alom- pra, etc.	1722-5. S.E. Af- ghanistan: Ghilzai. 1730. Hausa.	
	1760-70. Mexico.		1747-61. Af- ghanistan: Durani.		1760-70. Mexico.		1747-61. Af- ghanistan: Durani.	
	1760-1815. Lor- raine & Cent. France. 1780-1860. Ba- varia, Württemberg.	1799-1839. Sikha.			1760-1815. Lor- raine & Cent. France. 1780-1860. Ba- varia, Württemberg.	1799-1839. Sikha.		
	1800-25. Buenos Aires. 1800-66. Upper Saxony & Thu- ringia.				1800-25. Buenos Aires. 1800-66. Upper Saxony & Thu- ringia.			

WAVE I			WAVE II			WAVE III		
Early (a-m)	Peak (n-p)	Late (q-y)	Early	Peak	Late	Early	Peak	Late
	1818-28. Zulus: Chaka.	1817-40. Maskat.					1804-67. PARN.	1820-70. Para- guay.
	[1883-1902. S. African Dutch.] [1906 . . . Maz- andaran: Riza Khan, etc.]	1863-83. Mada- gascar: Hovas,		[1843 . . . Ice- land.]			1830-70. Fran- conia, Hesse, Rhine-land. [1860-5. Caro- lina: Confed- erates.] [1860-80. Rus- sia: empire.] [1871-1918. Ber- lin.]	

NOTE.—A few of the above instances disagree with the formula given in the text, because this table, unlike the rest of the paper, follows the revised formula :

$$x = 15 \pm 843n + 2940 (1 - \cos L) - 7025 M, \text{ which should be taken as a closer approximation.}$$



## AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

stances in Classes A and B, the others being of subordinate importance. Details intended to explain and justify the choice are omitted.<sup>1</sup> Capitals indicate Class A. The peak sections having been found to be *n o p*, those instances which fall wholly or more than half in these are placed in the middle column of each wave-series, but if any fraction less than half falls in *n o p*, the entry is set in an intermediate position. The large gaps in the three series are mainly due to the fact that the waves cross the Pacific Ocean and other large areas with little or no history.

The distribution of the 435 instances of culmination throughout the hypothetical cycle may be shown by weighting the instances, as explained above, and finding the percentages in each of the 25 sections of the cycle (see Fig. 2).

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>j</i>	<i>k</i>	<i>l</i>	
1.2	1.3	1.2	1.9	1.0	1.9	0.9	2.7	3.7	1.8	2.6	3.8	
<i>m</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>o</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>q</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>u</i>	<i>v</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>y</i>
6.1	13.2	25.0	12.3	2.4	2.8	2.5	1.6	1.5	2.5	2.0	2.5	1.6

Thus a quarter of the instances are crowded into *o*, and half into *n o p*. The result is so extraordinary that it is bound to be received with much scepticism, and it will undoubtedly be thought that the list of culminations has been arbitrarily compiled.

The weighting by classes has little or nothing to do with it. If all four classes are counted alike, *n o p* has 52.5 % instead of 50.5, and *o* has 24.4 instead of 25.0. The classes taken separately show the following percentages:

	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>
<i>n o p</i>	45.9	51.8	56.3	56.6
<i>o</i>	26.6	23.9	25.7	21.1

The rising percentage in *n o p* from A to D probably indicates a certain amount of bias, as the series proceeds from the well known to the little known. But this does not go far to explain the result. The question of bias is more important

<sup>1</sup> Where a ruler is mentioned, the dates are not necessarily the regnal years, but those within the time of culmination.

# THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW




FIG. 2. DISTRIBUTION OF CULMINATIONS IN 850 Yr.  
WAVE - CYCLE.




FIG. 3. VARIATION OF VITALITY THROUGH THE CYCLE.

## AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

than that of inaccuracy, which, though doubtless present, cannot seriously vitiate the general result. In searching for bias, it is perhaps most important to scrutinize the 74 instances in Class A, which are all well known, and for the most part, it is hoped, beyond serious challenge. In this class the percentage in *o* is 6.6 times the chance expectation, and in *n o p* 3.8 times. Any critic could find good reasons for rejecting some of the peak instances,<sup>1</sup> and for adding new ones in other parts of the cycle; but this would have to be done so drastically in order to bring the result within the probable limits of chance (not to speak of similar changes in dealing with the 361 instances in classes B, C, and D), that a hardly credible degree of bias, not to say perverse ingenuity, on my part would be revealed.<sup>2</sup> I venture to think that any representative list of 30 or 40 instances of the culmination of energy would show a decided preponderance in the peak sections *n o p*.

Another probable objection might be stated thus. Various local non-periodic factors, geographical and other, have, it might be urged, caused the gradual shifting of power and culture westward and north-westward from their early seats in the East, thus producing an apparent sequence, which by several empirical or arbitrary assumptions has been linked with other local sequences of a similar accidental character, thus producing the illusion of a universal periodic law. Clearly such an argument will only hold good if the instances supporting the periodic theory occur mainly in certain local or chronological groups, separated by other groups devoid

<sup>1</sup> In addition to the ages of David and Solomon and of Elizabeth, already mentioned, I reject those of Wu-ti of the Han dynasty, which was undoubtedly decadent, of Augustus, the energy of which centred, not in decadent Rome, but vigorous Cisalpina, of Antoninus Pius, which lacks the distinguishing features of a culmination, of the Nara age (with Kwammu) in Japan, which was imitative, not creative, and of Louis XIV, which is partly included in the culminations of S. and Central France, and in the North is a stage on the way to greater energy.

<sup>2</sup> Thus if the 34 instances in *n o p* (Class A) were reduced to 20, and the remaining 40 augmented to 70 (which I think extravagant assumptions), the percentage in *n o p* would still be 1.8 times the chance expectation.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

of any marked agreement. It is for the defence to show, if it can, that the formula holds good universally, on whatever principle the instances are classified. I have accordingly classified them in a variety of ways, and calculated the percentage in the three peak-sections *n o p* for each group, the chance expectation being 12.

Of the seven wave-revolutions in recorded history, the latest appearance of wave iii since its emergence from the Pacific may be ignored, as there are only two instances. The wave-revolution preceding it is only complete in parts of Polynesia and Melanesia, falling in the Malay Archipelago, and still rising in Japan, China, and India, which sufficiently accounts for the low percentage of culminations in *n o p*, viz. 22.2. Those in the five remaining revolutions range from 45.1 to 58.2. If the culminations are arranged in forty-six geographical groups, none falls below the chance expectation, and only four have less than twice that percentage, viz. N. Deccan 14.3, Further India 16.1, N. America 21.2, and N. Germany and the Netherlands 21.8. None of these four has more than 12 instances. The second is affected by the incompleteness of the last wave, and N. Deccan by the confusion produced by the Moslem conquests. N. America has hardly passed more than half through a wave since the discovery, before which the records are few and rather uncertain. The N. German group is perhaps unduly depressed by the inclusion of a number of tribal hegemonies of the Roman period—Cherusci, Chauci, etc.

Next we may compare the 15 zones of latitude, 4° wide, from the Equator to 60°, adding the instances from the southern hemisphere <sup>1</sup> to those from the northern, and counting all above 60° as a 16th zone. None of these zones has less than twice the chance expectation, and only two, 16°–20° (29.4 %) and 20°–24° (31.5) less than thrice.

Arranging the instances by centuries, the 18 instances before 800 B.C. being placed in two longer groups, we have

<sup>1</sup> These 23 instances show a high peak of 66.8 %.

## AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

29 time-groups, of which 4 have less than thrice the chance expectation in  $n o p$ , viz. the eighth century A.D. (21·2), first B.C. (31·6), first A.D. (32·5), and sixth B.C. (34·3). These correspond with the expansion of the Persian, Roman, and Arabian empires, with the accompanying depression of smaller powers and cultures.

In reply to the assumed objection that actual, non-periodic groups and sequences are artificially linked together, the above figures are perhaps significant, but it seems more important to examine the record from a cultural standpoint. A rough classification on the basis of the great cultural groups gives the following result, in descending order of agreement:

Chinese . . . . .	70·2
Roman West 500 B.C.-A.D. 450 (with Carthage, Gaul, etc.) . . . . .	66·7
Outlying groups (Pagan Negro, Amerindian, etc.) . . . . .	58·2
Hellenic and Hellenistic, to A.D. 450 . . . . .	56·4
Muhammedan . . . . .	50·4
Near East, before 500 B.C. . . . .	48·8
Byzantine, from A.D. 450 . . . . .	47·3
Dark Ages in the West, A.D. 450-1000 . . . . .	45·6
Modern West, with American colonies, from A.D. 1450 . . . . .	44·8
Middle Ages in the West, A.D. 1000-1450 . . . . .	44·0
Hindu . . . . .	42·9

If these 11 are subdivided into 32 sub-groups, none has less than twice the chance expectation, and only 6 less than thrice, viz.:

The Hellenistic East, 300-50 B.C. . . . .	24·0
Modern West, 1450-1530 . . . . .	25·1
Middle Dark Ages of the West (650-850) . . . . .	30·7
Early Dark Ages (450-650) . . . . .	31·0
Latin Middle Ages . . . . .	31·6
Hindus after 1250 . . . . .	35·5

Of 20 groups arranged on a linguistic and racial basis, only two, the Dravidian (24·4) and the Malay-Polynesian (25·6), have less than thrice the chance expectation. The highest are the Chinese, Negro, Armenian-Illyrian, and Turkish.

Finally, the instances may be classified by dividing them



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

into military, cultural, and mixed groups, and by distinguishing between those under native and alien rule :

<i>Instances</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>n o p</i>	
166.1	Military, native . . . . .	46.6	} military 44.9
34	Military, alien . . . . .	39.0	
17.7	Struggle against superior force . . . . .	38.4	
98.6	Military and cultural, native . . . . .	47.8	} mixed 48.2
24	Military and cultural, alien . . . . .	49.8	
70.1	Cultural, native . . . . .	66.1	} cultural 67.7
23.5	Cultural, alien . . . . .	73.3	

Thus the cultural culminations show a much greater concentration round the hypothetical peak than the military, perhaps because military strength depends on many special factors.

To sum up, we have, classified on five principles (geographical, zones of latitude, centuries, cultural, and linguistic-racial), 143 small groups with an average of 15.2 instances each. None has less in *n o p* than the chance expectation (12), 5 have less than twice, and 19 less than thrice. This analysis, I submit, offers strong evidence that the alleged periodicity is a genuine universal phenomenon.

It will have been noted that the great migrations and nomad conquests have not been included in the list. They represent a different type of activity, being largely the outcome of external forces, whether human or climatic, and they appear to lack the characteristic gradual process of growth and decay. Also the data are vague. I have therefore made a separate list, and applied the formula, with the following result.

47 invasions by nomads of the Eurasian steppes . . . . .	<i>n o p</i>	21.7 %
15 invasions by nomads of the Afrasian steppes . . . . .	"	42.0 "
44 invasions by displaced sedentary Europeans . . . . .	"	18.2 "

The Arabian and African nomads, at least, appear to show the same periodicity as settled communities in their culmina-

## AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

tions, though the instances are too few to be convincing. The more congested nomads of the great Eurasian steppes, and the non-nomadic Europeans driven from their lands, show only slight and doubtful traces of periodicity.

It will generally be felt that the preceding argument is unsatisfactory in so far as it depends on the element of personal judgment in the compilation of the list of culminations, an element inextricably and inevitably involved in it, in the absence of an independent list. I have therefore sought for one or two purely objective tests, derived from some series of physical data, capable of precise scientific measurement. Negative results would at most disprove any connexion with the physical phenomena in question, whereas positive results would probably afford the best possible support for the theory. The two tests I have applied are drawn respectively from vital statistics and climatic changes, and both in my opinion give definitely positive results. It is impossible in this article to give more than the briefest sketch of the methods employed.

*Vital Statistics.*—The Finnish statistician E. Rubin<sup>1</sup> has suggested an index of vitality  $\frac{d^2}{b}$ , where  $d$  and  $b$  are the death- and birth-rates, and a low index denotes high vitality. To make the index vary directly with vitality, and to get rid of fractions, I applied this in the form  $1,000 - \frac{10d^2}{b}$  to 723 cities and other small centres of population<sup>2</sup> in twenty-six countries, having collected the data for various years, ranging from 1905 to 1922, though only in the U.S.A., Spain, and the Netherlands after 1914. A precise position in the theoretic cycle at the date of enumeration could be assigned to each town, and thus a mean index was obtained for each of the twenty-five sections of the cycle. From  $d$  to  $o$  the mean index never falls

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of R. Statistical Society*, London, 1897, p. 154. To the courtesy of this Society I owe most of the vital statistics mentioned below.

<sup>2</sup> No urban vital statistics being available for Russia or Argentina, I have taken those for Governments, provinces and territories, omitting the very large areas.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

below 850 (mean 897), and from *p* to *c* only once (in *r*) rises above it (mean 822). Next the extreme or eccentric instances<sup>1</sup> were discarded, viz. those with indices above 950, mostly rapidly rising industrial centres, or residential centres with a high proportion of domestic servants, and secondly instances with indices below 700, mostly crowded old insaniary cities, centres from which there was heavy emigration, or places with a large Oriental or Negro population. The remaining 620 instances show a more regular curve, with a definite minimum of 789 in *y*, and a maximum of 916.5 in *lm* (see Fig. 3). To test the possibility that this favourable result is due to the fact that a large proportion of the data are taken from a few countries,<sup>2</sup> each with its peculiar hygienic and economic conditions, I divide each country or large region with at least 8 instances into from 2 to 5 zones, according to the sections of the cycle, and find the mean index for each zone. We can thus tell whether the cyclical movement is perceptible within the limits of one country (or region in a large country like the U.S.A.). Out of the 23 regions, 15 show complete agreement, and in 4 more, England and Wales, Sweden, Brazil, and Galicia-Bukovina, the discrepancy is not serious. The remaining 4—all American, Canada W. of Ontario, the W. and Middle States of the U.S.A., the S.E. States, and Chile—show no correspondence, but in each of these the conditions are in one way or another exceptional, and in the last two, which conflict most with the theory, coloured populations complicate the conditions.

It would be very desirable to double the number of instances, and to apply the test to countries like Japan, India, and N. Africa, which are scarcely represented at all. Nevertheless, the claim may be advanced, I think, that vital statistics, in spite of the indubitable multiplicity of the factors

<sup>1</sup> Highest, Hamtramck, Mich., 980; lowest, Newtown Ards, co. Down, 273.

<sup>2</sup> Nearly half the instances are taken from the U.S.A., England and Wales, Germany and France.

## AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

affecting them, definitely show the same periodicity as the formula. I would specially draw attention to the fact that the maximum of vitality shown by these statistics falls about eighty-five years earlier than the ostensible culmination found in the historical data.

*The Climatic Factor.*—The argument by which I seek to establish evidence from climatic changes in support of my theory is too long and complicated to be summarized here. I may, however, remark, by way of anticipation, that an attempt, not yet concluded, to apply the formula to Prof. E. Huntington's well-known observations and theories of climatic change already appears to indicate, in my opinion with some probability, that the stimulus given by the hypothetical wave, as it advances, manifests itself with increasing frequency after times of cyclonic disturbance and heavy precipitation, which, as it happens, are the times which Prof. Huntington associates with heightened human activity. On the other hand, the culminations which fall in the trough of the wave tend on the whole to follow protracted spells of dry weather. This suggests that these culminations may be due to other causes, quite unconnected with the theoretic wave. In arid countries, drought often leads to political unrest and revolution, with an access of new activity<sup>1</sup>; also it may well be that in humid countries, in the absence of the supposed periodic stimulus, excessive rain depresses activity, whereas a succession of dry seasons has a tonic effect. Be this as it may, it is not suggested that the alleged periodicity in any way affects climatic changes, but on the contrary that such changes affect the action upon human communities of the hypothetical stimulus, which, it appears, shows stronger effects after a rise in precipitation, and weaker effects after a fall.

Whether this climatic test will prove to be of value is doubtful, as it depends on uncertain premises; but it is an objective test in so far as it is based on conclusions independent of any theories of my own.

<sup>1</sup> E. Huntington in *American Historical Review*, vol. 18, 1913, p. 224 f.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

An examination of those culminations which are theoretically premature appears to show that they are mainly examples of the normal rise of energy, intensified by favourable circumstances, and especially (if we accept Huntington's theory) by the onset of stormy weather, and that they are cut short by overpowering external force, as of the great military empires, or (with the same climatic proviso) by abrupt climatic changes for the worse. Similarly, it may be argued that retarded culminations are often due to the removal of adverse conditions (climatic or other) prevailing at the time of the theoretic normal culmination. These suggested causes will be found, if applied to each case, to leave but a small residuum.

If I have succeeded in presenting a *prima facie* case for further investigation on the lines suggested in this article,<sup>1</sup> the next step should be a critical examination, and perhaps augmentation, of the historical data, uninfluenced by any consideration of their bearing on the theory; and when this is done a finer adjustment of the formula may perhaps increase to some extent the percentage of instances in the peak sections. If this is successful, we can proceed to arrange significant movements, events, and persons<sup>2</sup> according to their places in the cycle, and thus frame a synthesis of qualitative changes which form successive stages in the ideal cycle, in so far as the trend of history appears to depend on the unknown factor. A tentative scheme of this kind has already produced encouraging results, especially in the religious, artistic, and intellectual spheres. But it must never be forgotten that, if ultimately a periodic law in history should be established, its practical value would always be strictly limited by the existence of other factors, innumerable and incalculable. And it is well for the world that it is so.

<sup>1</sup> I hope shortly to publish a book in which the whole theory, together with the historical data, will be adequately set forth.

<sup>2</sup> It seems best, on the whole, to determine their position by the place of birth, which in the vast majority of cases is identical with the place of foetal and infantile life, probably the most important stage in the development of personality.



# AN ALLEGED PERIODIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The following books and articles, dealing in various ways with the subject, supply some valuable hints, although the different schemes proposed are to a great extent mutually exclusive.

- I. Kant: *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*. 1784. Predicts the discovery of general law in world-history, which will be heuristic and normative.
- E. v. Lasaulx: *Neuer Versuch einer allein auf die Wahrheit der Thatsachen gegründeten Philosophie der Geschichte*. München, 1857. Secular westward movement due to the earth's rotation. Local as well as universal periodicity. Nations are organisms, which mostly die young.
- Remy Brück: *Manifeste du magnétisme du globe*. Bruxelles, 1866. *L'humanité, son développement et sa durée*. Tomes 1 et 2. Paris, 1866. An elaborate theory based on an alleged magnetic cycle of 516 years, during which the centre of human activity moves westward  $6^{\circ} 37'$ . The historical instances, drawn from limited data, seem somewhat fantastic.
- E. Sasse in *ZS. des kgl. preussischen Bureaus*, 19. Berlin, 1879, pp. 21 ff. A succession of waves in each of five large regions, at irregular intervals; mean  $c. 1,150$  years.
- P. Mougeolle: *Les problèmes de l'histoire*. Paris, 1883. *Statiques des civilisations*. Paris, 1886. Secular poleward movement of civilizations from the torrid zone, complicated by E. and W. movements.
- U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: "Kulturperioden" (1897) in *Reden und Vorträge*, pp. 120-135. Berlin, 1901. Parallel developments of Græco-Roman and modern W. civilization. Suggested period of  $c. 1,500$  years (1200 B.C., A.D. 300, 1800).
- A. J. Balfour: *Decadence* (Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture). Cambridge, 1908. An unknown factor in political and national decadence. Latent genius evoked by "widespread exhilaration or excitement."
- W. M. Flinders Petrie: *The Revolutions of Civilisation*. London, Harper, 1911. Coincident fluctuations in Egyptian and European culture, with a mean period of  $c. 1,330$  (or  $c. 1,500$ ) years. Corresponding Mesopotamian changes  $c. 365$  years earlier, also Indian, Chinese, and Mexican. This little book contains many extremely valuable suggestions, but is perhaps vitiated in part by the author's well-known chronological system.
- Oswald Spengler: *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, vol. i, 1917, revised edition 1920; vol. ii, 1922; English transl. (*The Decline of the West*) by C. F. Atkinson, London, Allen & Unwin, 1926 and 1934. This much-discussed work traces the parallel developments of the

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

great culture-systems, treated as more or less independent units, the life of each being roughly 1,000 years.

Christopher Dawson: "The Life of Civilizations" in *The Sociological Review*, xiv, 1922, pp. 51-68, with table. A succession of world cycles of c. 1,500 years, showing simultaneous phases in the great culture-systems. Cf. in the same vol. (pp. 194-201) his criticism of Spengler, and his articles in later volumes of the *S.R.*

K. C. Schneider: *Die Periodizität des Lebens und der Kultur*, Leipzig, 1926. A modification of Spengler's scheme. Three successive world cycles of c. 2,100 years each.

G. Milner: *The Problem of Decadence*. London, Williams & Norgate, 1931. The decay of the West Roman empire never adequately explained. Parallel with the modern West. Suggested period of 1,721 years.

A. J. Toynbee: *A Study of History*. London, 1935, vol. iii, pp. 408-420. A 600-year period in nomadic movements, divided into alternate ages of advance and retreat.

General reviews of the chief theories of periodicity in R. Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, vol. i, 1893; and E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, Buch i, Das logische Problem der Geschichtsphilosophie, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, iii, Tübingen, 1922, especially pp. 705 ff.

# NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

By ALFRED MEUSEL

## PART II<sup>1</sup>

### *I. Husband and Wife*

THE position in which National Socialism wants to place women in the family and in society has been particularly clearly characterized by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr. Frick, in the following words: "The mother should be able to devote herself entirely to her children and the family, and the wife to her husband, and the unmarried girl shall only be allowed in those occupations which correspond to the female nature. For the rest, however, all occupations shall be the preserve of the husband."<sup>2</sup> The National Socialist programme for women therefore rests on three foundations:

(1) As many girls as possible shall become wives and mothers—the education of girls is to be directed all the time towards this goal.

(2) The wife and mother shall be restricted to a private life within the family—the achievement of this would mean the reintroduction of that division of labour between the sexes, characteristic for highly developed class societies but destroyed by capitalism during its progressive epoch, according to which the husband had a public *and* a private life but the wife *only* a private one. This division of labour is the basis for the polarization of sexes, consisting of the development of a "hundred per cent." man on the one hand and a "hundred per cent." woman on the other, and for patriarchal sexual morality, which gives to two beings of different sex

<sup>1</sup> Part I was published in *THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, April 1936. Both parts were translated by Mr. R. Baker.

<sup>2</sup> "The German woman in the National Socialist state." Quoted from *Voelkischer Beobachter*, June 12, 1935.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

living together in a lasting legalized manner property-like claims on each other.

(3) Unmarried women shall be confined to those occupations which National Socialism, or, more precisely, the National Socialist man, considers to be "natural," i.e. appropriate to the character of the female sex.

In order to understand why the National Socialist programme for women has assumed precisely this shape, let us enquire into the interests of the *trust bourgeoisie*, who decide the *class content* of National Socialism, and into the social situation of the *petty bourgeoisie*, who provide the *mass basis* of National Socialism.

As consumer, i.e. as head of a household, husband and father of a family, the trust magnate is not especially interested in the National Socialist programme for the family, for his wife and his daughters are "in the home," i.e. they practise no paid profession; and even if one of his daughters prefers to study and enter a profession rather than marry a nobleman, then National Socialism will certainly not prevent that. And the fact that the Third Reich provides the bourgeois household with cheap servants has not in the least the same importance for a general director or the owner of a mine as it has for a teacher or a grocer.

The interest of monopoly capitalism in the National Socialist programme for women is only intelligible when we consider the trust magnate in his capacity of functioning, i.e. accumulating, capitalist. We have already described in the first part of this article why German monopoly capitalism is interested in the greatest possible increase in the size of the population<sup>1</sup>: *the policy, which proclaims marriage and motherhood as the "natural occupation" of women and which seeks to stimulate the desire to marry in every conceivable way, is an integral part of the National Socialist population policy.* To this must be added, secondly: the wife who has been restored to the family and who cooks, washes, sews, mends, scrubs, irons, knits, etc.,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Part I of this article, pp. 174-6.

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

furnishes the household with a number of goods and services which would otherwise have to be paid for. *The more hard-working and thrifty the wife, the less she uses for herself, so much the lower can the income of the father of the family fall without an appreciable deterioration in the living conditions of the whole family.* This possibility of economizing is by no means limited to actual *wages*, but extends also to expenditure on various kinds of social and cultural services: hospitals, kindergarten, etc. Especially important in this connexion is the reduction in unemployment relief: the policy for creating work consists partly of replacing female by male labour-power; i.e. a woman, who has *no* claim on unemployment relief, is dismissed and replaced by a man, who *has* a claim; in this way a process appears statistically as creating work, but consists in reality of changing the occupants of a certain number of posts.

We have now mentioned the most important motives which—from the standpoint of the interests of the trust bourgeoisie—favour the National Socialist programme for women; in order to understand why the middle classes support this programme, we must first of all distinguish between the “old” and the “new” middle classes<sup>1</sup>—for each of these sections has different motives.

The “old” middle classes consist of peasants, artisans, small traders, inn-keepers, etc.; in the period of fully developed capitalism they are the only social stratum in which family relationships are *simultaneously* relationships of production. In a country so severely afflicted by the general crisis of capitalism as Germany, the old middle classes have been frightfully devastated, and this process is by no means at an end. They are ground between the upper and the nether millstones: on the one hand they are oppressed by high taxes, high prices for their means of production, high rates of interest; on the other hand they suffer from the restricted purchasing-power of the workers, employees,

<sup>1</sup> A. Meusel: *Middle Class*, *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. X, pp. 115 ff.



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

civil servants, members of the liberal professions, etc. The old middle classes seek to counteract this two-sided threat by depressing the standard of living of the family productive community. When the peasant, artisan, or trader becomes enthusiastic for the slogan "Women belong in the home," then this means: "we must have cheap labour-power at our disposal—therefore our daughters shall not work in any big capitalist concern and leave their parents in the lurch."

From the standpoint of the "new" middle classes, of employees, civil servants, and members of the liberal professions, anti-feminism is a pure question of competition—after anti-Semitism the second big and effective competition slogan. Employees, students, and young lecturers have exerted a much greater influence on the character of the National Socialist propaganda than, for example, the duller and less loquacious peasants. Thus the misleading impression could arise that anti-feminism was a purely middle-class concern, a question purely of the competitive claims of the new middle classes, and had nothing to do with the new bourgeoisie or the old middle classes.

It would lead too far afield if we were to demonstrate here why, in capitalist society, a pure "middle-class policy," distinguishable from the aims of the capitalist upper stratum and of the working class, does not and cannot exist. Even if we omit this problem and confine ourselves to a narrow middle-class standpoint, it is clear that the removal of women from economic life does not benefit *the whole* of the middle classes but, at the most, only particular groups temporarily. For—to begin with the old middle classes—the peasant or artisan who has two daughters may find it advantageous if the girls are forced to remain at home and work in the family business—but what will become of the younger daughter, when the older one marries and her child or children inherit the family possessions, but she remains unmarried? So far as the new middle classes are concerned the slogan "Women belong in the home" corresponds to the

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

wishes of *young* men, "incorrigible bachelors," and married couples who have *only* sons or who are without children—and we have already mentioned that bachelors and married couples without children are not exactly highly esteemed by National Socialism.<sup>1</sup> An elderly civil servant, for example, is hardly menaced at all by female competition; but if he has several daughters who are unable to find partners of equal rank or to enter a qualified profession, and who therefore finally have to follow some other course, either marrying below their rank or finding work as servants, shorthand typists, or saleswomen, then the operation of the National Socialist programme for women entails for him and his family an unmerited fall from the social level he had already reached—a fate which is felt all the more keenly because the new middle classes are the very stratum with the strongest desire for *individual* rise in the social scale.

Like National Socialism in general, so also the National Socialist programme for women in particular has had extraordinarily little attraction for the industrial working class. From the standpoint of the working class the competition of women against men has naturally been much more important than the (negligible) competition of Jewish against "Aryan" workers; that the male workers nevertheless have not demanded the driving of women out of industry is explicable on the following grounds:

(1) In Germany there had existed for a long time a kind of division of labour between "male" and "female" industries—which naturally did not exclude border-line cases of competition between male and female labour continually created afresh by technical progress.

(2) Whereas among the middle classes the number of wives employed away from home was small, among the proletariat it was and is large; consequently the father of a proletarian family considers female labour not as a question of competition but as a means of increasing the family income.

<sup>1</sup> See Part I of this article, p. 182.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

(3) The socialist labour movement, after a little hesitation, adopted the view that the problems of female labour could *only* be solved by a joint struggle of working men *and* working women for improving their conditions of living and for the reconstruction of society, and *not* through the men endeavouring to keep the women out of jobs or to remove them. As this conception is realistic, i.e. it corresponds to the real basis of the existence of the worker, it influenced not only the attitude of the workers organized politically and in the trade unions, but also the whole working class.

The above cross-section of the attitude of the various social strata to the National Socialist women's programme would be incomplete if not supplemented at least by an allusion to the question of how the women themselves have reacted to it. In contrast to both the monarchical, protestant German Nationalists, and to the catholic Centre, the National Socialists were *not* one of the Parties that benefited from the women's franchise in the Weimar Republic; but nevertheless there was a whole host of enthusiastic National Socialist women, especially among the middle classes. That is explicable partly by the fact that if one adheres to the more general social and political principles of National Socialism one can raise little objection against its women's programme, because it is a logical deduction from these principles; but beyond that, the women's programme itself made a considerable appeal to the younger women, for National Socialism promised to compensate for the loss of employment and of political rights by a happy life as housekeeper, wife, and mother; and this appeal became all the more attractive, the more empty, repulsive, and uncertain the average women's work grew under the influence of rationalization and crisis. Belief in the promises National Socialism made to women was certainly weakened by the fairly widespread knowledge of the existence of the "surplus of women." But quite apart from the fact that it is extremely difficult and probably impossible to obtain exact statistical measurement of this

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

phenomenon, girls who had not yet definitely passed the limit of marriageable age<sup>1</sup> treated the surplus of women in the same way as, in Schopenhauer's view, all sensible men treat death: as a theoretical or abstract necessity, which however for special reasons is practically insignificant in the case of the individual concerned.

No matter whether many or few women agree with the National Socialist programme for women; if it were ever put into operation the social position of German women would be even worse than that of their sex in ancient Athens or Tsarist Russia. The claim that women remained within the family before the rise of capitalism, and that they are now to be restored to the family as their natural and original sphere of activity, conceals the *essential* fact that the same word "family" applied to the pre-capitalist *and* the capitalist epoch means something quite different. When women left the family and entered employment outside their homes they did so not under the ideological influence of individualism, liberalism, Marxism, Jewry, or the "search for pleasure"<sup>2</sup> but because capitalism robbed the family of one productive function after another. The wife who has been restored to the family, who has to busy herself all day long with matters which almost every child knows could be done more simply, better, and in a more dignified manner in other ways, is far from being the "sovereign queen of the household" as Krieck and Goebbels term her<sup>3</sup>; she is rather a dejected female appendage to the poor handloom weavers, whom Queen Elizabeth loved so much that she did not want their work to be taken away from them by a machine.

<sup>1</sup> Marriageable age has both an *objective* and a *subjective* limit (in the consciousness of the girl in question), and these two limits naturally do not necessarily coincide.

<sup>2</sup> "The materialist conception of life of the liberal-Marxist epoch also contaminated and poisoned women. . . . Their whole life consisted of the search for material pleasures." Hiller, *Der Frauenarbeitsdienst*, p. 11 (Berlin-Leipzig, 1934).

<sup>3</sup> E. Krieck: *Nationalpolitische Erziehung*, 19th ed., p. 63 (Leipzig, 1935); Goebbels, "Mutter und Kind als Unterphand für die Unsterblichkeit unseres Volkes." Speech to the National Socialist women's organization. Quoted from *Voelkischer Beobachter* of February 13, 1934.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

The fact that the duties which National Socialism imposes on women as housekeepers are a case of atrophy—measured by the standards of modern technique—will shift the relationship between husband and wife in favour of the husband and to the disadvantage of the wife. A series of other factors works in the same direction. The view (advanced by National Socialism) that the unmarried childless woman has missed her real calling, leads to the necessary conclusion that the woman does not too carefully enquire into the personality of the man who is kind enough to offer to marry her, and that she does not so conscientiously probe into her own feelings with regard to him—especially when she is neither rich nor young and beautiful and must therefore count on the suitor in question being the last or the only one. The woman must marry a man whom she does not love because he offers her a means of existence and a socially recognized position; she must remain with him for precisely the same reasons. The husband, who is superior *within* the family, is simultaneously a subordinate *outside* the family, in professional and political life. He will be inclined therefore to obtain the “confirmation of his differentiation” in the treatment of his wife (and children).<sup>1</sup> The probability that this will occur is all the greater because the totalitarian state provides extremely fertile soil for the growth of sadistic and masochistic perversions of instinctive life: towards this end operate the glorification of force, the appeal to the sword as the final arbiter in all social questions, the disparagement of all truly human values which—like kindness, justice, love of freedom and peace, adherence to one’s principles—are either openly despised or ideologically misused so as to deceive opponents who believe in them.<sup>2</sup> To that must be added the fact that

<sup>1</sup> “He (the slave) makes animals and implements feel that he is not the same as them, but a man. He provides himself with the confirmation of his differentiation in that he mishandles and ruins them *con amore*.” Marx, *Das Kapital*, vol. I, 6th ed. p. 159, note 17 (Hamburg, 1909).

<sup>2</sup> In regard to *pacifism* the well-known Colonel Hierl (founder of the National Socialist Labour Service) makes the following appropriate remarks: “There are two kinds of



## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

National Socialism (like Fascism generally) implies a far-reaching militarization of social life. It is characteristic of a soldier that he does not live together with a woman, but that his relations with her are limited to a few hours, or perhaps minutes. Precisely these "momentary" experiences, in which the woman is valued not as a total personality but as the possessor of specific sexual attributes, are frequently associated with an intensification of the aggressive components of male instinctive life verging on sadism or outspokenly sadistic in character.

In addition to the man who may still have intercourse with women, even although momentary and deformed, there is the homosexual man. The extraordinary spread of homosexuality in the Fascist totalitarian state is anything but an accident. In order to understand this phenomenon correctly we must remember that a youth, in school, in the "Young People," in the "Hitler Youth," the labour service, and in the storm troops is always and everywhere surrounded by members of his own sex. The *Männerbund* (community of men) is however not only a fact but also a philosophy, inculcated into the youth by teachers who are innately predisposed towards glorification of their own sex. If the heterosexual component of the instinctive life of a particular youth is strong enough, then he will ultimately find his way to a woman and have the above-mentioned "momentary"

pacifism—the true pacifism, which is a product of timidity, and the false, which is a recognized political weapon indispensable to any preparation for war. *This latter Pacifism* lulls the adversary by peaceful professions and thus tempts him to neglect his armed defences. The potential foe is thus enveloped in a smoke-screen of verbiage which serves the further purpose of concealing our own armaments." (Hierl, *Grundlagen einer deutschen Weltpolitik*, p. 6 (Nat.-soz. Bibliothek, Ed. G. Feder. Vol. XII, Munich, 1929).

Concerning the selection of a red background for the National Socialist Party flag, Hitler says: "The average bourgeois was quite terrified that we had also adopted the red of the Bolsheviks. . . . The German Nationalists always whispered to themselves on the quiet that we were basically only a variety of Marxism. . . . How often have we shaken with laughter about these silly bourgeois alarmists. . . ." Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, vol. II, pp. 126-7.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

intercourse with her<sup>1</sup>; but if his sexual constitution is more flexible, the heterosexual component being less and the homosexual more strongly developed, then the former will ultimately languish and the latter will become over-developed, i.e. he will become homosexual.

National Socialism, which wants to restore women to the family, at the same time produces men who are as unsuitable for marriage as they possibly could be.<sup>2</sup> The woman will find no compensation in her relationship to her children for what she is deprived of in her relationship with her husband: for firstly, as a direct result of her existence being confined within the family, she will lack that experience and breadth of outlook which are in general necessary for successful educational activity, and secondly, the ideology and practice of the *Männerbund* will reduce the influence of the mother over her son in every conceivable way.

After having thus examined the position of the woman in her "natural calling" as housekeeper, wife, and mother, we must say a few words about the "appropriate" occupations into which unmarried women are to enter. Leaving aside midwives, washerwomen, charwomen, and domestic servants, those occupations which are recognized by National Socialism as "appropriate" are difficult to discover. That is by no means an accident; for if one really wanted to determine for what occupations women are suited or unsuited, then one would have to admit them to all occupations; but as in fact the very opposite occurs, the man, who alone has a deciding voice politically, can extend the list of unsuitable occupations at his own free will without ever being contradicted by practice. *The natural suitability which the National*

<sup>1</sup> "They (the members of the S.S.) have a manly devotion to the movement, and the women had to adapt themselves to that, or, as the Upper Silesian expressed it when he was relating a quarrel with his fiancée who once wanted to keep him away from his group meeting and he replied: 'My group during the day and you at night!'" *Tiefenbach, S.S.*, pp. 132-3 (Oldenburg, Berlin, 1934).

<sup>2</sup> "The German husband is to-day educated not for, but against marriage." I. Reichenau, "Die begabte Frau" in *Deutsche Frauen an Adolf Hitler* (edited by I. Reichenau), 3rd ed., p. 18 (Leipzig, 1934).

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

*Socialist Männerbund claims for women is the natural suitability which it itself establishes.*

One may say in general with regard to the problem of female labour in the Third Reich: entry into professions requiring academic qualifications, for which women in Germany as in other capitalist countries conducted a long and difficult fight, will be almost completely barred again; as in the early period of female labour, employment will be associated with social disqualifications for girls from the upper middle classes—they will have to enter the stratum of lower employees or the working class.

This, however, indicates the limit at which the wave of reaction against female labour will reach a certain standstill; for in a monopoly capitalistic, highly industrialized country like Germany one cannot simply eliminate the big mass of female workers and employees from economic life. We noted previously that the National Socialist programme for women is in the interest of monopoly capitalism; to be more precise we must now add that *the incomplete operation of this programme is in the interest of monopoly capitalism*. If the programme were ever even approximately realized, it would mean a strong tendency towards increasing male wages—not to mention the inevitable technical upsetting of many labour processes. But the situation is quite different if the programme actually exists but is only operated to a degree that harmonizes with the interests of the employers; then it acts as a means of keeping the whole wage structure depressed, for the numerous unemployed women, no longer registered at the unemployment exchanges, are glad to get even a badly paid job; and over those who are still in work hangs the Damoclean sword of dismissal.

From August 1933 to the end of September 1935 479,190 marriage grants were paid out in Germany (including Saar territory).<sup>1</sup> Since one of the conditions for receiving marriage grants is that the bride must have been in insurable

<sup>1</sup> *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 15 Jg., Vol. 35, p. 816.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

employment, this figure means that a corresponding number of women have been transferred from an "artificial" to a "natural" occupation. At the same time however—according to the official statistics—the number of women in employment has not fallen, but increased—although not to the same extent as employed males.<sup>1</sup> These two factors—increase of marriages *and* more female labour—are, apart from the stimulation of the former by marriage grants, to be traced entirely to the wave of prosperity in the armaments industries. The future development of female labour depends on whether the collapse of the armaments boom, which is inevitable in the long run, takes place in the form of a new cyclical crisis or whether—which is more probable—German monopoly capital seeks an escape from the threatening crisis in an imperialist war of conquest. In the first case hundreds of thousands of women and girls will be dismissed *before* the heads of families, and the ideology that married women belong in the family and unmarried ones in "appropriate" occupations will be utilized propagandistically to the fullest extent; in the second case women will become soldiers.

The necessary training of women for military service (a process which may at most be slightly delayed by doubts among the highest party leaders, but which cannot really be avoided)<sup>2</sup> is already far advanced. Section I, para-

<sup>1</sup> According to the *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich* (Vol. 54, 1935) in the period from January 31, 1933 to April 30, 1933 unemployment among women decreased by:

657,047 workers
108,646 employees

Total 765,693

At the same time the proportion of women to the total number of occupied persons fell; it now amounts to 31.7 per cent., as compared with 35 per cent. (1933) and 34.4 per cent. (1928-9). This (relative) decline in female labour has less to do with the National Socialist ideology concerning women than with the fact that the "creation of work," i.e. rearmament, has benefited above all the "male" industries (coal mining, iron industry, stone and light metal industries, machine construction, wagon building, automobile industry, shipbuilding, etc.), cf. *Vierteljahrsheft für Konjunkturforschung*, 11 Jg., 1936, Vol. 1, Pt. B., p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> "If in Marxist countries to-day women's battalions are being formed, then one can only say: that will never take place with us! There are things which men do and for

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

graphs 2 and 3 of the new German military law reads: "Every German man is liable to military service. In time of war, in addition to military service, every German man and every German woman is obliged to serve the Fatherland."<sup>1</sup> In conjunction with the reintroduction of conscription, the labour service, which before had been formally voluntary,<sup>2</sup> was made compulsory for men and women. Just as service in the labour camp is rightly regarded as the first half-year of military service, so in its turn service in the youth organizations is preparation for the labour service. The sports displays of the "League of German Girls," field exercises, night marches, pack marches, shooting practice, are often justified on the ground that Germany needs healthy women and mothers<sup>3</sup>; in fact they serve this aim much less than that of training efficient female soldiers. Up to now the "League of German Girls" has been half-way between a voluntary and a compulsory association; now the "Young People" (for the ages 10-14 years) and the "Reich Youth" (14-18 years) are becoming organizations which will include all German youth—girls and boys. When these organizations are established properly the military service of boys and girls will be a fact.

The military organization of girls and women also takes place in another way: in the coming war women will have to play a much greater and more important rôle as workers than in the last war; they will have to replace the mobilized men, provide the additional labour-power for the war industries, and act as strike-breakers.<sup>4</sup> *It is characteristic of the*

which they alone are responsible [Loud applause]. I should be ashamed of being a German man, if ever in the case of war even a single woman had to go to the front."

A. Hitler to women. Quoted from: *Frankfurter Zeitung* of September 15, 1935.

<sup>1</sup> *Reichsgesetzblatt*, No. 52, Pt. I, of May 22, 1935.

<sup>2</sup> The labour service was even before then formally not completely voluntary; e.g. matriculants admitted to the university must have performed half a year of labour service before being allowed to take up their studies.

<sup>3</sup> "... the desire for freshness, strength, and health is a means to the end of providing Germany with healthy mothers." G. Usadel, *Die Nationalsozialistische Jugendbewegung*, p. 35, (Bielefeld und Leipzig, 1934).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Frauenbeilage to Volkischen Beobachter*, July 7, 1935.



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

"totalitarian" war that it removes the distinction between worker and soldier to a certain extent. The modern soldier has become a highly skilled specialist; the working man or woman in the war industries will become a kind of soldier: he will be subject to the same military laws and exposed to the same hardships and dangers. *National Socialism* (like *Fascism* generally) leads necessarily to a militarization of the female sex, which is simply incompatible with the patriarchal-authoritarian character of the official programme for women.

The wedge which war and the preparation for war drives into the National Socialist programme for women receives ideological expression in the fact that groups have developed, partly inside and partly outside the National Socialist Party,

from which women themselves have been excluded. These groups have been organized since 1933, and they have been working for the last three years.

servants, those occupations which are recognized by National Socialism as "appropriate" are difficult to discover. That is by no means an accident; for if one really wanted to determine for what occupations women are suited or unsuited, then one would have to admit them to all occupations; but as in fact the very opposite occurs, the man, who alone has a deciding voice politically, can extend the list of unsuitable occupations at his own free will without ever being contradicted by practice. *The natural suitability which the National*

<sup>1</sup> "They (the members of the S.S.) have a manly devotion to the movement, and the women had to adapt themselves to that, or, as the Upper Silesian expressed it when he was relating a quarrel with his fiancée who once wanted to keep him away from his group meeting and he replied: 'My group during the day and you at night!'" *Tiefenbach, S.S.*, pp. 132-3 (Oldenburg, Berlin, 1934).

<sup>2</sup> "The German husband is to-day educated not for, but against marriage." I. Reichenau, "Die begabte Frau" in *Deutsche Frauen an Adolf Hitler* (edited by I. Reichenau), 3rd ed., p. 18 (Leipzig, 1934).

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

of thought like Erich and Mathilde Ludendorff) they cannot understand that the National Socialist programme for women can be unified neither on *their* basis nor on that of the official patriarchal line, that it is and remains full of contradictions, because it reflects the contradictory tendencies which influence the social position of women in the period of the general crisis of capitalism. One can hold out the ideal of the Sleeping Beauty, who remains in her father's castle until the beautiful young prince pushes his way through the thorny hedge and wakes the dreamer with a kiss; or one can accustom the rising generation of women to work a machine-gun and wear a gas mask; but one cannot think of a Sleeping Beauty ~~who is not awake~~ and that is what National Socialism tries

mean a strong tendency towards increasing male wages—not to mention the inevitable technical upsetting of many labour processes. But the situation is quite different if the programme actually exists but is only operated to a degree that harmonizes with the interests of the employers; then it acts as a means of keeping the whole wage structure depressed, for the numerous unemployed women, no longer registered at the unemployment exchanges, are glad to get even a badly paid job; and over those who are still in work hangs the Damoclean sword of dismissal.

From August 1933 to the end of September 1935 479,190 marriage grants were paid out in Germany (including Saar territory).<sup>1</sup> Since one of the conditions for receiving marriage grants is that the bride must have been in insurable

<sup>1</sup> *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 15 Jg., Vol. 35, p. 816.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

employment, this figure means that a corresponding number of women have been transferred from an "artificial" to a "natural" occupation. At the same time however—according to the official statistics—the number of women in employment has not fallen, but increased—although not to the same extent as employed males.<sup>1</sup> These two factors—increase of marriages and more female labour—are, apart from the stimulation of the former by marriage grants, to be traced entirely to the wave of prosperity in the armaments industries. The future development of female labour depends on whether the collapse of the armaments boom, which is inevitable in the long run, takes place in the form of a new cyclical crisis or whether—which is more probable—German monopoly capital seeks an escape from the threatening crisis in an imperialist war of conquest. In the first case hundreds of thousands of women and girls will be dismissed *before* the heads of families, and the ideology that married women belong in the family and unmarried ones in "appropriate" occupations will be utilized propagandistically to the fullest extent; in the second case women will become soldiers.

The necessary training of women for military service (a process which may at most be slightly delayed by doubts among the highest party leaders, but which cannot really be avoided)<sup>2</sup> is already far advanced. Section I, para-

<sup>1</sup> According to the *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich* (Vol. 54, 1935) in the period from January 31, 1933 to April 30, 1933 unemployment among women decreased by:

657,047 workers
108,646 employees

Total 765,693

At the same time the proportion of women to the total number of occupied persons fell; it now amounts to 31.7 per cent., as compared with 35 per cent. (1933) and 34.4 per cent. (1928-9). This (relative) decline in female labour has less to do with the National Socialist ideology concerning women than with the fact that the "creation of work," i.e. rearmament, has benefited above all the "male" industries (coal mining, iron industry, stone and light metal industries, machine construction, wagon building, automobile industry, shipbuilding, etc.), cf. *Vierteljahrsheft für Konjunkturforschung*, 11 Jg., 1936, Vol. 1, Pt. B, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> "If in Marxist countries to-day women's battalions are being formed, then one can only say: that will never take place with us! There are things which men do and for

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

graphs 2 and 3 of the new German military law reads: "Every German man is liable to military service. In time of war, in addition to military service, every German man and every German woman is obliged to serve the Fatherland."<sup>1</sup> In conjunction with the reintroduction of conscription, the labour service, which before had been formally voluntary,<sup>2</sup> was made compulsory for men and women. Just as service in the labour camp is rightly regarded as the first half-year of military service, so in its turn service in the youth organizations is preparation for the labour service. The sports displays of the "League of German Girls," field exercises, night marches, pack marches, shooting practice, are often justified on the ground that Germany needs healthy women and mothers<sup>3</sup>; in fact they serve this aim much less than that of training efficient female soldiers. Up to now the "League of German Girls" has been half-way between a voluntary and a compulsory association; now the "Young People" (for the ages 10-14 years) and the "Reich Youth" (14-18 years) are becoming organizations which will include all German youth—girls and boys. When these organizations are established properly the military service of boys and girls will be a fact.

The military organization of girls and women also takes place in another way: in the coming war women will have to play a much greater and more important rôle as workers than in the last war; they will have to replace the mobilized men, provide the additional labour-power for the war industries, and act as strike-breakers.<sup>4</sup> *It is characteristic of the*

which they alone are responsible [Loud applause]. I should be ashamed of being a German man, if ever in the case of war even a single woman had to go to the front."

A. Hitler to women. Quoted from: *Frankfurter Zeitung* of September 15, 1935.

<sup>1</sup> *Reichsgesetzblatt*, No. 52, Pt. I, of May 22, 1935.

<sup>2</sup> The labour service was even before then formally not completely voluntary; e.g. matriculants admitted to the university must have performed half a year of labour service before being allowed to take up their studies.

<sup>3</sup> "... the desire for freshness, strength, and health is a means to the end of providing Germany with healthy mothers." G. Usadel, *Die Nationalsozialistische Jugendbewegung*, p. 35, (Bielefeld und Leipzig, 1934).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Frauenbeilage to *Voelkischen Beobachter*, July 7, 1935.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

"totalitarian" war that it removes the distinction between worker and soldier to a certain extent. The modern soldier has become a highly skilled specialist; the working man or woman in the war industries will become a kind of soldier: he will be subject to the same military laws and exposed to the same hardships and dangers. *National Socialism (like Fascism generally) leads necessarily to a militarization of the female sex, which is simply incompatible with the patriarchal-authoritarian character of the official programme for women.*

The wedge which war and the preparation for war drives into the National Socialist programme for women receives ideological expression in the fact that groups have developed, partly inside and partly outside the National Socialist Party, which more or less decisively reject the prevailing patriarchal doctrine and demand not the "equality in value" proclaimed by Fascism but full equality of status in the family, in occupational, political, and military matters.<sup>1</sup> In support of their demand they point to the high place which the woman is supposed to have occupied among the old Germanic tribes and they attribute responsibility for the enslavement of the German woman to the patriarchally minded Jew and to Oriental-Pauline Christianity—whilst, let us note in passing, the patriarchal National Socialists like Rosenberg, Goebbels, Buch, or Feder make the Jew responsible for the emancipation of women.

Because the National Socialist exponents of "the rights of women" are seriously and determinedly concerned with the totalitarian war, they recognize quite correctly that the National Socialist programme for women is, in this respect, rather a hindrance than a help; but since they are at the same time National Socialists (either actual Party members, like Frau Rogge-Boerner and the circle around the "*Deutsche Kämpferin*," or representatives of a special line

<sup>1</sup> "And women want to become capable of bearing arms again. Girls who volunteer and are physically fit should be trained in regular courses of instruction for the emergency which is bound to call them to national defence." S. Rogge-Boerner, "Denkschrift an den Kanzler des Dritten Reiches," in *Deutsche Frauen an Adolf Hitler*, op. cit., p. 10.



## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

of thought like Erich and Mathilde Ludendorff) they cannot understand that the National Socialist programme for women can be unified neither on *their* basis nor on that of the official patriarchal line, that it is and remains full of contradictions, because it reflects the contradictory tendencies which influence the social position of women in the period of the general crisis of capitalism. One can hold out the ideal of the Sleeping Beauty, who remains in her father's castle until the beautiful young prince pushes his way through the thorny hedge and wakes the dreamer with a kiss; *or* one can accustom the rising generation of women to work a machine-gun and wear a gas mask; but one cannot think of a Sleeping Beauty with a gas mask—and *that* is what National Socialism tries to do.

### *II. Parents and Children*

The development of family upbringing in bourgeois-capitalist society is characterized by two tendencies:

(1) The family ceases to be the only or even the most important educational factor: it is robbed of its importance by kindergarten, school, sports organizations, and youth associations.

(2) The old authoritarian upbringing, based on the absolute power of the parents and the duty of absolute obedience on the part of the children, gradually weakens under the influence of pedagogical ideas, which have regard for personality already in the child and seek to develop its will and feeling of responsibility.

The first of these two tendencies, the transference of education from the family to social institutions (and consequently the diminution of the functions of the family) will continue in the Third Reich; and that for several reasons. In this connexion we need first to remember the simple fact that a really sympathetic education requires an extensive life in common between teacher and pupil. That the family in the modern city lost its importance as an educational

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

factor is connected at least in part with the circumstance that the various members of the family move in quite different spheres of life and consequently have no more time for each other. National Socialism has not lessened this lack of time, but increased it. In one of those more harmless whispered jokes, which to-day in Germany function as semi-legal criticism, it is said that a genuinely German family is one in which the husband is a Party official, the mother is in the women's organization, the son in the storm troops, and the daughter in the "League of German Girls," and which meets once a year at the Reich Party Congress at Nuremberg.

It may be objected that the severance of family connexions owing to the amount of time members are required to devote to political duties is a temporary phenomenon which will again disappear with the ebbing of the tide of political excitement.<sup>1</sup> This argument does not hold water, for, firstly, there is every probability that the future will continue to be a time of great political tension; and secondly—and this is the most important thing—the lack of time, which encroaches upon family life and therefore upon family education in the totalitarian state, is not an *accident*, but a *necessity*; it must be renewed if it should ever tend to grow less.<sup>2</sup> In Germany there are at least three groups of families which cannot be relied upon to educate the youth in the direction of frictionless "incorporation" in the prevailing system and whose educational influence the Fascist state is compelled to weaken, viz.: proletarian, Catholic, and "reactionary" families.<sup>3</sup> Whilst the first two concepts are clear, the third needs a little

<sup>1</sup> J. v. Leers, "Heller Morgen," in *Die deutsche Kämpferin*, Vol. 2, p. 210 (1934).

<sup>2</sup> "Mussolini is concerned with the people not only during but also after work. How does this affect the man in the street? He is never left to himself. The state takes him in hand and leads him. . . . He is never alone. The state is for him the last place of refuge." Goebbels, *Der Faschismus und seine praktischen Ergebnisse* p. 26 (Berlin, 1934).

<sup>3</sup> We intentionally omit Jewish families because the problem is quite different for them. National Socialism does not aim at withdrawing Jewish children from the influence of their parents, but seeks to enclose them together with their parents in a new and very complete Ghetto.

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

explanation. To "reaction" (in the National Socialist sense) belong those circles which do not stand quite *high* enough—like the trust bourgeoisie—to grasp the inherent necessity of National Socialism for capitalism, and who do not stand low enough—like the impoverished and radicalized petty bourgeoisie—to form a part of its mass basis. The fact that the "reactionary" opposition has at times been very prominent<sup>1</sup> should not blind us to the fact that it is least "radical" of all, i.e. goes least of all to the root of things. The controversy between the National Socialists on the one hand and the German Nationalist, Protestant, monarchist circles on the other, concerns not the *content* of the (capitalist) social system but the question of how this system is to be defended. But as, the longer the Third Reich exists, the answer will become increasingly clear in favour of the National Socialists, one has to count on the disappearance of the "reactionary" opposition; then National Socialism would be no longer interested in preventing the educational work of *this* type of family. In contrast to this it can *never* permit proletarian parents, and Catholic ones *as good as never*, to exert a decisive influence on the upbringing of the rising generation. *And as proletarian and (bourgeois and peasant) Catholic families together<sup>2</sup> constitute far more than half of the total of German families, the advance of the state at the expense of the family as the educational agent is no transitory phenomenon, but an essential part of the National Socialist system.*

In the above exposition the relation between family and state has been treated as if parents as teachers were an undifferentiated unit. If we now give up this simplifying assumption and consider father and mother as two separate partners in education, then the increasing absorption of educational functions by the state becomes still more in-

<sup>1</sup> Here belong the opposition movement of the (now dissolved) Stahlhelm, the struggle of the Confessional Church against incorporation, and the resistance of the feudal and big bourgeois student corporations to their subordination to the National Socialist student League.

<sup>2</sup> The Catholic *proletarian* families are included under proletarian families.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

telligible. We explained in the previous section why National Socialism, which wants to restore women to the family, at the same time weakens the influence of the mother over her children, especially over her sons.<sup>1</sup> Proceeding from the *Männerbund* and from the "Leadership ideology" one might think that the declining prestige of the mother would correspond to a growing prestige of the father; but this tendency is frustrated by the following factors:

(1) The separation between occupational and home life, characteristic of capitalism, and ultimately also between leisure (of the husband) and his home life, has led to the educational work of the family becoming more and more an affair for the mother—complaints that fathers no longer care about their children are almost as old as capitalism itself. National Socialism can and will alter none of this; it has increased, and rendered inescapable, claims on the time of the father beyond his regular work, through service in various political organizations.

(2) National Socialism develops sexual character in such a way as to make the husband unsuited not only for living together with a wife but also for a common life with his own children: the two types whose development is favoured by the National Socialist *Männerbund* are not family fathers.<sup>2</sup>

(3) In pre-war Germany the child of a bourgeois family grew up with the idea that its parents (especially the father) were perhaps not exactly almighty, but at least very mighty; it realized much later than the proletarian child that the paternal power had limits. National Socialism has intensified both *objectively* the dependence of the family father on coercive social forces, and *subjectively* the consciousness of this dependence on the part of the child; this process makes a particularly sharp impression because the child itself enters very early into direct relationship with the totalitarian state power, which dominates the life of his father.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 398.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 397-8.

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

The transference of education from the family to the state is explicable not only (*negatively*) through the mistrust of National Socialism for certain families and through the undermining of the educational influence of "well-meaning" parents also; it is *positively* an expression of militarization—of youth as well as of the whole of society. It goes without saying that the family is unsuited for the military training of the rising generation. In those states in which the military played a predominant rôle, in those strata from which the warriors came, the boys were only educated in the family when they were very young, if at all; already at this time however the influence of the mother was reduced to the smallest possible extent.

The educational power, which the Fascist totalitarian state takes away from the family, is transferred to a lesser extent to the school and to a greater extent to the semi-military youth organizations; compulsory membership of these associations begins in Italy in the sixth and in Germany in the tenth year. One must clearly realize that the authoritarian state, which, as the true big leviathan, seizes the six- and ten-year-old child and, having seized it, never lets it go again, means the end of family education. In bourgeois family theories—irrespective of their particular shade—education appears in the first place as a task of the parents; Church and school play subsidiary rôles, but they can only do that in so far as the family has prepared the way for them. In the Fascist state the relation between the chief and the subsidiary factors of education is reversed: education is regarded as a directly political task, in the fulfilment of which the parents have to assist, when and in so far as their will harmonizes with the aims of the state.<sup>1</sup> In feudal and guild society of the Middle Ages all authority was either directly

<sup>1</sup> "National Socialist legal policy derives the new educational law entirely from considerations of the interests of the people. The right of parents to bring up their children becomes a duty with unlimited responsibility undertaken on behalf of the people under the supervision of the state." Dr. Webler (Director of the German Youth Archives). Quoted from *Berliner Tageblatt*, February 28, 1935.



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

paternal or based on the paternal pattern: God was the Father of all creatures, the Pope was the holy father of all faithful children of the Church, the prince was the father of his subjects, etc. In monopoly capitalistic Fascist society, on the other hand, all authority is derived from the highest political power, from the "Duce" or "Fuehrer"; the head of the family does not possess authority over his children *because* he is their *father*, but because, as father within the sphere of the family as delimited by the state, he is also their *leader*.

With these remarks the question of the fate of the authoritarian principle in education appears to a certain extent to have been answered. That National Socialism wants to revive an education based on absolute commands and "blind" obedience, that in this respect it represents a reaction from the humanization of educational methods begun by the progressive liberal bourgeoisie and continued by socialism, is a direct consequence of its general social function of supporting decadent German monopoly capitalism as long as ever possible. An education aimed at assisting the child towards independent thought and action would be incompatible with this aim; for then millions of workers, petty bourgeois, intellectuals, etc., would fight against the Fascist state instead of allowing themselves to be incorporated in it.

But the change introduced into education by National Socialism consists not only of reversing the order of importance of the educational factors and of its desire to restore authoritarian education; beyond that it is noteworthy that *the same National Socialism, which wants to restore the authoritarian principle to a place of honour, at the same time attacks and weakens it.*

In order to understand the inevitability of this development we must remember that from the sixth year onwards two, and from the tenth year onwards three educational factors compete for one and the same child. It is inevitable that the stronger factor will push the weaker one into the background and thereby weaken its prestige: and the stronger

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

one is almost always the semi-military youth organization, the weaker one is the home.

This process is by no means an unforeseen accidental result. It is also not explicable through practical failure to harmonize the three educational factors; but rather the logical and necessary result of the National Socialist educational policy. We have already mentioned the conflict between National Socialism and "reactionary," Catholic, socialist, and communist families. If the totalitarian state really wants—as it undoubtedly does—to educate the children of these families on its own lines, then it is not enough for it to take them away from their parents for a certain number of hours each day or week. No, it must directly attack the views prevailing in the families in question, it must stimulate politically, socially, and religiously coloured generation conflicts, and it must in these conflicts appear to take sides *for* youth and *against* age. Thus it happens that National Socialism, which affirms authoritarian education as the pedagogic incarnation of the leadership principle, at the same time glorifies youth as the generation "which is always right."<sup>1</sup>

National Socialism encourages children to criticize their parents—in the name of National Socialism. The importance of this in principle is not only that a young strong bearer of authority replaces an old and outworn one; it means rather that the authoritarian principle itself is placed in doubt: for obedience "without asking why" is, like its opposite, criticism, to a certain extent indivisible; and whoever encourages criticism to-day but simultaneously demands blind unconditional obedience to himself may find to-morrow that he has unleashed a power which does not stop at him.

*The inconsistency of National Socialism in regard to the authoritarian principle has its deepest roots in the fact that the concern of all*

<sup>1</sup> "The main thing is to succeed in bringing youth into the leadership of the state: for age may be superior to youth, I do not know in what respect, but youth is always right." Goebbels, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

*education with the imperialist war and with preparation for this war clashes with that principle.* This statement, which at first seems paradoxical because military organization was once the core of all authoritarian bonds and because to-day still, in National Socialist literature, 99 out of every 100 references to the need for authority are founded on military necessities, can nevertheless easily be substantiated. The old authoritarian education, in which the family was also the "primary cell" of the state in the sense that the child learnt to obey in it, and then later transferred this attitude of obedience to social authorities, was a good preparatory school for an army whose cohesion in battle depended—in Frederick II's clear and precise formulation—on the fact that the soldier always feared his officers slightly more than his enemies. This organization based on a primitive military technique, which received its first decisive defeat in the fight against the French revolutionary armies, has to-day become a complete anachronism. The mechanization of armies, the development of submarines, tanks, aeroplanes, and special weapons has transformed the soldier from a precision machine automatically carrying out the commands of his superiors into a highly technical specialized worker with detailed knowledge and a relatively wide radius of individual action. For the education of the new soldier, the *Kadavergehorsam*, drill symbolized by the corporal's stick, has become not only senseless but positively harmful. *In this way there arises the peculiar contradiction that German monopoly capitalism, for its own self-preservation, which is inseparably connected with successful imperialist expansion, must create an army which begins to grow beyond its own social foundation, since it can no longer be held together by command and submission but only through intelligent co-operation and a high degree of voluntary initiative, since therefore its cohesive principles no longer correspond to class society but to solidaristic society.*

It is characteristic of bourgeois society in the period of the general crisis of capitalism that it is no longer in a position to elaborate and carry through an educational programme

## NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE FAMILY

based on a uniform and coherent foundation. National Socialism defends a decaying class society. Therefore it has to educate the children of the lower and middle classes to that "suffering obedience," which Luther described as the correct attitude for a faithful Christian. But National Socialism will also defend this society by warlike means. Therefore the same men who are required to show self-sacrifice, humility, and subordination, *without being allowed to ask the reason why*, are also expected to develop self-consciousness, initiative, and willingness to accept responsibility—*without being allowed to ask the reason why*.

The contradiction in National Socialist educational principles has—just like that in the programme for women—penetrated not from books into life but from life into books. Its solution therefore cannot consist of taking sides for one or the other of the two principles<sup>1</sup> and seeking to talk the other out of court, but only in the development of both side by side and in opposition to each other up to that historical turning-point at which its dialectical solution becomes possible in a new order of society.

<sup>1</sup> "What constitutes dialectical movement is precisely the existence side by side of the two opposite poles, the conflict between them, and their dissolution into a new category. When one only raises the problem of eliminating the bad pole, one cuts the dialectical movement in two." K. Marx, *Das Elend der Philosophie*. (Answer to Proudhon's *Philosophie des Elends*. 2nd. ed. pp. 94-5 (Stuttgart, 1892).

## IRISH MIGRATION TO AND FROM THE REST OF THE BRITISH ISLES

*By* R. S. WALSHAW

THE entry of aliens into Great Britain for the purpose of taking up employment is strictly controlled. There is on the other hand no power to restrict the entry of British citizens from the Dominions. Apart, however, from the return of those emigrants who left Great Britain and failed to establish themselves in either Canada or Australia, there is no movement of citizens into Great Britain in search of work, except from Ireland. The gateway from Ireland is, then, the only one which is now both freely open to and used by persons who wish to find employment in Great Britain. The extent to which this avenue is used has become a matter of much interest and importance in view of the unemployment in Great Britain. But though the extent of Irish immigration has been much discussed, the figures which are usually quoted are incomplete and often misleading. The varying and sometimes wild statements which have been made on the subject merely emphasize our ignorance of the facts. Recently a questioner in the Dáil asked what was the approximate number of young men under thirty years of age who left the Free State in 1935 to seek permanent employment in England. The Minister for Industry and Commerce could only say in reply that the information was not available in his Department. Also during the last few years, questions have been asked in Parliament with regard to the number of Irish who have entered and found work in England or Scotland. On different occasions, both the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of Labour have stated that no figures are available. In this article an attempt is made to ascertain the volume and direction of Irish migration to and from the rest of the British Isles.

In the absence of direct information, this end can only be



## IRISH MIGRATION

reached in a round-about way. Passenger statistics are only compiled for those travelling by sea directly between the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom. The margin by which the number of passengers from the Free State to the United Kingdom exceeds the number in the opposite direction, may for several reasons give quite an incorrect estimate of the migration from Ireland to Great Britain. In the first place the figures do not include the passengers between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The number sailing between Northern Ireland and Great Britain is not known. Also, as no record is taken of those who cross the land frontier from the Free State to Northern Ireland, any passenger between the Free State and Great Britain who travels via Northern Ireland will not appear in the passenger figures. Further, as the quickest route between the Free State and Scotland lies via Northern Ireland, the number of people who do this may be considerable.

Although there is no complete record of the movement between Ireland and Great Britain, it is possible within limits to deduce from certain official figures the number of Irish who enter Great Britain each year. The statistics available for this purpose refer separately to the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland. An official record is taken of all those who pass directly between the Free State and places outside the British Isles. The Department of Industry and Commerce in Dublin compiles four distinct figures each year. These enumerate the inward and outward passengers directly between the Free State and countries outside Europe, as well as the inward and outward passengers directly between the Free State and Europe. The same Department also publishes a figure for those who cross to the United Kingdom in order to emigrate, in addition to another for the immigrants who arrive in the Free State after first disembarking at some port in the United Kingdom. Similarly, all persons travelling between Northern Ireland and places outside the British Isles are counted. The Registrar-General's Annual

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Report for Northern Ireland states the balance of these passengers inward or outward as the case may be. The other statistics available refer to deaths, births, and population. In both the Free State and Northern Ireland the Registrar-Generals record the number of births and deaths which occur each year. Also in both countries an estimate is made of the population to the nearest thousand at the middle of each calendar year.

Taking first the figures for the passengers travelling directly between the Irish Free State and places outside Europe, the amount that the number of outward passengers exceeds the inward passengers gives the direct loss of people from the Free State to countries outside Europe. Similarly, for the passengers travelling between the Free State and Europe, the difference between the outward and inward figures gives the direct loss of people to Europe. The sum of these two results shows the direct loss to all places outside the British Isles. Next are considered the figures for those who pass through the United Kingdom and so move indirectly between the Free State and places outside the British Isles. The margin by which the number of such emigrants exceeds the immigrants gives the indirect loss of people from the Free State to places outside the British Isles. Adding the direct and indirect losses we get the total loss of population by migration between the Free State and places outside the British Isles. Death causes a further loss of people and the number of deaths is added to the migration loss just obtained. The number of births, however, adds to the population and is therefore deducted. So we arrive at the total change in the population of the Irish Free State owing to the following factors taken together : (a) migration to and from places outside the British Isles, (b) deaths, and (c) births. Column I, in the Table given below, shows what this change was for each of the years 1924-34.

Using the mid-year population figures for the Free State, a freehand graph can be drawn showing the variations in

## IRISH MIGRATION

the population over the eleven-year period considered. The change in the population during each calendar year is then read from the ordinates of the graph. From a large-scale graph it is possible to estimate a population change for the Irish Free State to the nearest two hundred. Column II of the Table shows this graphical estimate of the increase or decrease in the population which occurred in the Free State during each of the calendar years 1924 to 1934. From 1924 to 1929 there was a continual decline in the population. For each of these years, however, the actual fall in population shown in column II was greater than the decrease indicated by those factors considered in column I. After 1930 the population of the Free State rose. But the actual increase each year, except for 1934, was not so great as it would have been if the only factors involved were those in column I. It is evident, therefore, that for all the years in question, except for 1934, there must have been some further loss of people which has not yet been taken into account. Now column I allows for the loss caused by death as well as for the loss by migration between the Free State and places outside the British Isles. Clearly the only other possible loss is a migration from the Free State to places inside the British Isles. Thus the numerical difference between columns I and II shows the net loss of people from the Free State to places within the British Isles. The figure for this migration from the Free State to Great Britain and Northern Ireland together, appears in column III in the Table.

Turning next to Northern Ireland, the statistics which refer to passengers, deaths, births, and population also lend themselves to similar treatment. The result of such a procedure for Northern Ireland is given in column IV and shows the loss of people by Northern Ireland owing to migration to places within the British Isles, i.e. to Great Britain and the Irish Free State together. Finally, the algebraic sum of the losses by migration to places within the British Isles from Northern Ireland (column IV), and from the Free State

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

(column III), gives the net gain by Great Britain from Northern Ireland and the Free State together. Column V shows the magnitude of this migration to Great Britain from the whole of Ireland during each of the years 1924-34. The figures in column IV show at once that the net migration to or from Northern Ireland is always very small. Practically the whole of Irish migration therefore simply concerns the Free State.

TABLE  
IRISH MIGRATION (Thousands)

YEAR	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
1924 .	3.5	- 19.0	22.5	2.2	24.7	8.3	14.2	16.4
1925 .	- 8.1	- 17.7	9.6	2.8	12.4	3.8	5.8	8.6
1926 .	- 5.6	- 13.3	7.7	1.3	9.0	8.8	- 1.1	.2
1927 .	- 6.0	- 11.8	5.8	.1	5.9	14.6	- 8.8	- 8.7
1928 .	- 1.4	- 5.1	3.7	1.1	4.8	6.5	- 2.8	- 1.7
1929 .	- .5	- 1.7	1.2	- .7	.5	7.6	- 6.4	- 7.1
1930 .	6.6	4.6	2.0	- .7	1.3	5.9	- 3.9	- 4.6
1931 .	20.8	15.1	5.7	- 1.1	4.7	6.5	- .8	- 1.8
1932 .	27.5	17.6	9.9	.3	10.2	8.8	1.1	1.4
1933 .	22.3	17.3	5.0	- .7	4.3	7.6	- 2.6	- 3.3
1934 .	20.8	22.2	- 1.4	.2	- 1.2	12.5	- 13.9	- 13.7

Column I shows the change which would be produced in the population of the Irish Free State owing to the following factors taken together: (a) migration to and from places outside the British Isles, (b) deaths, and (c) births.

Column II shows the actual population change in the Free State during the calendar year.

Column III is found by subtracting column II from column I and shows the loss of population by the Free State by migration within the British Isles.

Column IV shows the loss of population by Northern Ireland by migration to places within the British Isles.

Column V is found by adding columns III and IV and shows the gain of population by Great Britain from the whole of Ireland.

Column VI shows the direct migration from the Free State to Great Britain.

Column VII is found by subtracting column VI from column III and shows the balance of passengers from the Free State to Northern Ireland.

Column VIII is found by subtracting column VI from column V and shows the balance of passengers from Northern Ireland to Great Britain.

Next we consider the official returns for the passengers travelling by sea between the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom. Among the passengers from the Free State to the United Kingdom are those crossing for the specific purpose of using some port in the United Kingdom in

## IRISH MIGRATION

order to emigrate. The number of these emigrants is simply deducted from the total number of passengers travelling in this direction in order to find the number of persons who leave the Free State and end their journey in the United Kingdom. Similarly, the passengers from the United Kingdom to the Free State include certain immigrants entering the Free State who come from countries outside the British Isles and find it convenient to travel via the United Kingdom. These immigrants are taken from the passengers travelling in their particular direction to deduce the number of persons initially in the United Kingdom who sail to the Free State. Thus we arrive at corrected figures for the passengers travelling by sea between the Free State and the United Kingdom. Now over the whole period considered the United Kingdom has been composed merely of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. If, therefore, we neglect the few people who sail between the Free State and Northern Ireland, the corrected passenger figures simply represent the direct movement of people between the Free State and Great Britain. The number of passengers embarking from the Free State for Great Britain is always greater than the number moving in the opposite direction. The difference in the magnitudes of these two streams of people therefore gives the direct migration from the Free State to Great Britain and is shown in column VI in the Table.

Comparison shows that the figures of column VI do not agree with those in column III. In 1924, for example, column III indicates that the Free State lost 22,500 people by migration to places within the British Isles. Column VI, however, shows that during the same year the direct migration from the Free State to Great Britain was only 8,300. Clearly the only way in which the remaining 14,200 could leave the Free State is by crossing the land frontier from the Free State to Northern Ireland. Thus the difference between columns III and VI gives the balance of the passengers travelling by land from the Free State to Northern Ireland.




## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

This balance is shown for each year in column VII. The presence of the negative sign for certain years means that the direction of the movement is sometimes reversed, being from Northern Ireland to the Free State.

Nor do the figures of column VI agree with those of column V. Taking again the 1924 figures as an example, column V shows that altogether Great Britain receives 24,700 migrants from the whole of Ireland. As column VI reveals that only 8,300 of these entered Great Britain directly from the Free State, it is evident that the other 16,400 must have crossed to Great Britain from Northern Ireland. The amount by which the figures of column V exceed those of column VI therefore gives the balance of the passengers who cross from Northern Ireland to Great Britain. This balance is shown in column VIII. The occurrence of the negative sign again indicates that the direction of this movement is also sometimes reversed, being from Great Britain to Northern Ireland.

The figures in columns VII and VIII exhibit a definite similarity both in magnitude and in sign. This is made more apparent by using them to plot the two curves shown below in Graph A.

**GRAPH A.**



## IRISH MIGRATION

It will be understood that when the curve is above the horizontal line, the movement is from the Free State to Northern Ireland or from Northern Ireland to Great Britain as the case may be, and when it is below the line the movement is in the opposite direction. The strict correlation of the curves proves two things. Firstly, the number of people moving between the Free State and Northern Ireland (shown dotted) is always very nearly equal to the number moving between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Secondly, the two movements always take place in a similar direction. When there is a balance of passengers from the Free State to Northern Ireland, there also occurs during the same year an equal movement from Northern Ireland to Great Britain. On the other hand, if there is a stream of people from Great Britain to Northern Ireland, there is invariably an equal stream from Northern Ireland to the Free State. We therefore infer that these two streams are really composed of the same people who travel between the Free State and Great Britain indirectly via Northern Ireland. Further, it is reasonable to suppose they choose this route because they are passing between the Free State and Scotland. From the point of view of Northern Ireland, as they pass straight through they are simply transmigrants.


The small difference between columns VII and VIII, in the 1924 figures for example, would make it appear that sometimes the number of transmigrants increases slightly on leaving Northern Ireland. This can only be due to a few people initially in Northern Ireland joining the movement. In other years, such as 1929, when the number appears to suffer a slight decrease on leaving Northern Ireland, a few people evidently remain behind in Northern Ireland. But the discrepancy between columns VII and VIII is always so small as to leave no doubt that the part played by Northern Ireland in the migration to and from Scotland is very small indeed.

The smaller figure numerically of columns VII and VIII

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

is the one which strictly refers to the people passing straight through Northern Ireland. This transmigration figure, which we have assumed to represent the migration between the Free State and Scotland, is plotted below in the dotted curve of Graph B. Also on this same assumption that all the migrants between the Free State and Scotland take the quickest route and travel indirectly via Northern Ireland, we conclude further that the direct movement from the Free State to Great Britain simply measures the migration from the Free State to England and Wales. The figures for this movement are already given in column VI and we now use them to draw the second curve of Graph B.

**GRAPH B.**



Graph B therefore summarizes the results which we have reached with regard to Irish migration within the British Isles. The dotted curve represents the migration from the Free State to Scotland, while the other curve shows the migration from the Free State to England and Wales. Again, when the curve is above the horizontal line, the movement is from the Free State to Scotland or to England and Wales, whereas when it is below the line the movement is in the

## IRISH MIGRATION

opposite direction. In 1924 and 1925 more Irish entered Scotland than entered England and Wales. But in 1926 the stream of Irish to Scotland ceases and then in the following year becomes reversed. The dotted curve reveals that, except during the one year 1932, the Irish in Scotland have been continually returning to Southern Ireland ever since 1926. This conclusion is confirmed to some extent by the fact that a smaller number of Irish were enumerated in the Scottish census of 1931 than of 1921. The fact that this decrease occurred mainly in Glasgow also suggests that the reversal of the previous flow of Irish to Scotland was caused primarily by unemployment and the slump in shipbuilding on the Clyde.

The other curve shows that the migration of Irish to England and Wales has been continuous though fluctuating. During every year between 1924 and 1934 there has been an influx of Irish which has never been less than 4,000 (in 1925) and never more than 15,000 (in 1927). The yearly average is about 8,000. But it is not altogether obvious with what conditions the fluctuations are correlated. Irish migration to England and Wales increased during and after the dislocation caused by the strikes of 1926, but fell before the results of the world depression were experienced. It remained fairly steady during the worst part of the depression and has recently expanded. The object of this paper, however, is not to discover the causes of Irish migration but to establish the facts. It would appear that the facts are not as generally supposed. Of late years there has been an exodus of Irish from Scotland, whence come the loudest outcries against Irish immigration. Scottish nationalists have complained that "the Irish have taken our jobs; they are coming across here and taking our work." Also it has been asked, "Is there any chance of improving the conditions in the west of Scotland until the volume of Irish immigration is controlled?" But the graph shows that instead of the supposed movement of Irish into Scotland, many of the Irish living in

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Scotland have recently returned to Ireland. On the other hand, there has been a continual movement of Irish into England and Wales on a scale sufficient to make more serious the unemployment problem in the southern part of Great Britain.

during the one year 1923, the Irish in Scotland had been continually returning to Southern Ireland ever since 1920. This conclusion is confirmed to some extent by the fact that a smaller number of Irish were enumerated in the Scottish census of 1921 than of 1920. The fact that the decrease occurred mainly in Glasgow also suggests that the reversal of the previous flow of Irish to Scotland was caused primarily by unemployment and the slump in shipbuilding on the Clyde.

The index curve shows that the migration of Irish to England and Wales has been continuous though fluctuating. During every year between 1914 and 1924 there has been an influx of Irish which has never been less than 4,000 (in 1922) and never more than 15,000 (in 1927). The yearly average is about 8,000. But it is not altogether obvious with what conditions the fluctuations are correlated. Irish migration to England and Wales increased during and after the depression caused by the strikes of 1926, but fell before the results of the world depression were experienced. It remained fairly steady during the worst part of the depression and has recently expanded. The object of this paper, however, is not to discover the causes of Irish migration but to establish the facts. It would appear that the facts are not as generally supposed. Of late years there has been an exodus of Irish from Scotland, whence come the loudest outcries against Irish immigration. Scottish nationalists have complained that "the Irish have taken our jobs; they are coming across here and taking our work." Also it has been asked, "Is there any chance of improving the conditions in the west of Scotland until the volume of Irish immigration is controlled?" But the graph shows that instead of the supposed movement of Irish into Scotland, many of the Irish living in



## LITERARY TASTE AND DEMOCRACY

By Z. WARREN GODDARD

LITERARY taste, vague and undefinable, manifesting itself most clearly in the changes of its form from century to century, seems to be based on two standards, the one rigid, formulated by the most articulate class of contemporary society, the other more flexible, an expression of the needs and wishes of a more general public and to be perceived by the study of literature against a larger historical and social background. The part these two standards play in literary production and criticism varies according to the country and the period and the whole structure of society, or as Taine expresses it, "le race, le milieu et le moment." In England, on the whole, the second implicit and more elastic standard has always made itself more felt than the explicit and arbitrary ruling of tradition or of one small section of opinion, dictating the form and subject that literature must adopt. Such a body is the French Academy, which formerly controlled literary expression, to a large extent, in France. French literature from the days of Boileau has been guided by certain formulated rules rather than by the desire to express the social life of the times. The reason for this difference in literary traditions between the two countries lies partly in the difference of their whole social and political structure.

In France at the end of the seventeenth century all interest and all power centred round the king and in a lesser degree his court. The bourgeois and artisan strove as far as it was possible to imitate his richer neighbour's way of living and to be accepted into his class. The life of Versailles became in a sense a pattern for the nation, destroying the more interesting individual differences between classes, professions, trades. Writers drew their scenes from the aristocratic circles only and disregarded utterly the working classes of the nation whose toil enabled the courtiers of Versailles to live so magnificently.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

In England, on the other hand, the feudal system, which still kept the peasant in subjection in France, had vanished, carrying with it the entire authority of one class over another. Class distinctions did not mean, as in France, the monopoly of political and financial privileges by the aristocracy, but a difference of custom, dress, and speech that carried with it a certain independence and contempt for those of another class or trade. To a French writer of the seventeenth century, even if he discovered such distinctive features in the different classes of his own country, they were of little interest. His subject, partly by choice and partly by social taste, was man, apart from his surroundings, as an individual and not as a member of society. The background, the social status of the hero or heroine with Racine or Molière, is but incidental in the portrayal of a human being, a prey to jealousy, ambition, or torn by the struggle between love and duty, situations which are not peculiar to any one class.

It would be inaccurate, however, to see French literature as an artificial production of Society, divorced from the real life of the nation. In spite of the dominance of the Classical school, the eighteenth century saw the gradual replacement of the explicit arbitrary standard by the more natural and implicit standard, that of literature as an expression of society. Boileau believed that he had laid down the rules for the more important literary "genres" for the subsequent generations, but he ignored the novel as unworthy of consideration. This type of literature therefore is the first to make some attempt to reflect the social background.

The novel, with its intention of being a mirror of society, indicates more clearly than any other type of literature the taste and the conventions of its time. An age when readers were mainly to be found in the aristocracy, would be likely to produce a novel that dealt chiefly with life at court or in the homes of the nobility, as did most of the seventeenth-century novels in France. The chief characters were kings and princes or, a little later in the century, dukes and duchesses.

## LITERARY TASTE AND DEMOCRACY

Even if, as in the pastoral novels, they masqueraded as shepherds and shepherdesses, they remained, under their disguise, idly philandering courtiers and noble dames whose minds had never been burdened with the problem of earning their own living. In their anxiety to accentuate the difference between them and the vulgar bourgeois, they attributed to themselves idyllic virtues, constancy that endured through countless years, courage that faced every conceivable hardship, chivalry that made every man a perfect knight and lover, and every woman a goddess to be wooed by years of patient devotion. The bourgeois, in the few novels where he makes an appearance, has none of these ideal qualities, but rejoices in a refreshing common sense, denied the aristocratic hero. His delight in the things of the flesh rather than in those of the spirit make him a true descendant of Gargantua and Pantagruel. Aristocratic convention turns him very often into an absurd and unsympathetic figure; the victim of practical jokes or perpetrator of knavish tricks, he is considered incapable of deep feeling, undisciplined, a creature of material needs and appetites. While aristocratic taste ruled the literary world, this conventional figure of the bourgeois remained almost unchanged in fiction.

With the declining years of Louis the Fourteenth, his death and the accession of the pleasure-loving Louis the Fifteenth, the court at Versailles gradually ceases to be the centre of literary France. The bourgeois in politics, in social life, in literature alike is becoming aware and resentful of the privileges enjoyed by an idle and undeserving nobility. Literary taste, in accordance with the changing political ideas of the time, begins to widen, to approve of subjects hitherto thought unfit for literature. The critics, always a little behind the writers of the time, at first deplore the treatment of any but the wealthy classes in fiction. "*Le quartier de la Halle et de la Place Maubert*," writes Grim, "*a sans doute ses mœurs, et très marqués même, mais ce ne sont pas les mœurs de la nation; elles ne méritent donc pas d'être*

peintes." Their protest becomes fainter as the eighteenth century advances.

It needed, however, a writer of genius to make the bourgeois a serious and sympathetic figure in fiction, acceptable to both aristocratic and middle-class readers. Le Sage in his choice of a lackey as hero of *Gil Blas* or of an impoverished tutor in the *Bachelier de Salamanque* proved conclusively that the servant might have as interesting adventures and as complicated a character as his master. The French public raised its hands in horror at his picaresque novel, *Guzman d'Alfarache*, unlike the English who delighted in tales of roguery such as Fielding's *Jonathan Wild*. Le Sage, although he forced his readers to accept a hero from the humble folk, in a certain measure yielded to popular taste by enabling his characters during the course of their adventures to rise in the social scale. In the bourgeois novels of the seventeenth century of Furetière, Sorel, and Scarron, the seigneur's relations with the bourgeois are hardly touched upon. They remain classes apart that cannot possibly meet on an equal footing. With Le Sage appears the first serious criticism of the nobleman in fiction. *Gil Blas*' honesty and common sense contrast very favourably with the deceit, selfishness, and stupidity of the Spanish courtiers, who, during a brief spell of power, must wait upon his bidding. In early eighteenth-century France, however, there could be no open criticism of the nobility even under the Spanish disguise adopted by Le Sage. *Gil Blas* is the leader of a whole line of lackeys in literature who voice the servant's growing impatience with his master's undeserved privileges, a protest that becomes clearer and clearer until Figaro, to an acquiescent and even approving audience of courtiers on the eve of the Revolution, says, "Qu'avez-vous fait pour tant de biens? Vous vous êtes donné la peine de naître et rien de plus." The wheel of public taste had then come full circle.

Le Sage had done his work in convincing his readers that the novel of adventures, then exceedingly popular in France,

## LITERARY TASTE AND DEMOCRACY

could be as easily written round a hero whose main occupation was earning his own living as a prince who sought strange lands and unusual adventures in order to win a lady's love. He did not convince people, however, that the middle-class hero was morally superior to the aristocrat. Gil Blas is a man of the world, alive to the wickedness of others and ready to be honest when he is convinced that honesty is the best policy, but he is no pattern of the virtues like his aristocratic predecessors in the novels of Mlle de Scudéry or Mme de la Fayette. None but a prince could be capable of the exquisitely refined feelings of a Princesse de Clèves. Novelists and critics alike agreed in attributing a more materialistic point of view to the lower classes, not unreasonably since they, for economic reasons, had no time or inclination for the lengthy analysis of their feelings, indulged in by the elegant folk of Versailles and the Paris salons. Marivaux was the first to see the psychological importance of the lower-class character in fiction and to analyse the mind of a shop-girl or of a peasant as minutely as that of a wealthy lord or lady. His subtle portrait of Marianne, the linen-draper's assistant, aroused admiration by its wit and delicacy, but incurred severe condemnation from the older type of critic who regretted his bad taste in introducing characters of the poorer Parisian classes, especially his description of a quarrel between the linen-draper and a coachman which they considered "indigne d'un homme bien élevé et très dégoûtant dans un ouvrage." And yet despite his innovation of choosing hero and heroine from the poor, we see Marivaux yielding to popular opinion when he makes Marianne an orphan of unknown aristocratic origin, conscious, although forced to earn her own living, of her greater sensibility, "delicatesse," and her moral superiority over those folk with whom she is obliged to live and work. It is significant that in his other novel, *Le Paysan Parvenu*, Marivaux had stressed the peasant's lack of idealism. Jacob the peasant, like his predecessors in fiction, represents sturdy common



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

sense, ambition for material wealth, and a readiness to exploit others for his own ends. Popular taste had allowed the lower classes to enter the novel, but it was still far from regarding them as sympathetic or noble characters.

The eighteenth century saw, however, a rather remarkable change in this attitude of literature towards the masses, a change of which aristocratic France would probably have been incapable, had not foreign influence played a large part. During this period France made the discovery of England, chiefly owing to Voltaire's *Lettres Anglaises*, where he compared English ways and institutions with those of the French, somewhat to the detriment of the latter. In the first flush of this anglophilia, everything English found favour in the sight of the French, and not the least discovery was the English novel. The democratic realism of Defoe's *Moll Flanders* and *Colonel Jacque*, which would have revolted French taste, had given place to the moral and psychological novels of Richardson, whose first novel told the story of Pamela, a servant maid, whose moral conflicts and tender outpourings were as lengthily described as any princess's of the previous century.

Richardson took France by storm ; his novels when translated won the approval of all the critics, inspired innumerable imitations, and aroused the enthusiasm of the reading public which, moved to the depths of its facile sensibility, shed tears over the trials of Pamela and the sad death of Clarissa. He answered a new need in fiction, that of the middle-class wives and daughters who, in their growing prosperity, found leisure to read. The seventeenth-century "romans galants" did not appeal to them, nor did Crébillon's novels of dissolute court life under the Regency. They desired a novel with a love interest, but with characters not so entirely removed from their own rank of life that the story appeared improbable. It flattered their sense of importance that the greatest contemporary English novelist should devote so many volumes to a heroine of the bourgeoisie, who showed herself

## LITERARY TASTE AND DEMOCRACY

as capable of self-analysis as any introspective duchess whose passionate outpourings had filled so many novels of the early eighteenth century. Pamela and Clarissa, whatever we may think of them to-day, were in their author's eyes noble characters torn between love and duty, who claimed for the bourgeois the right to play a serious, sympathetic rôle hitherto denied him in fiction. Richardson with his romantic sensibility endeared himself to the French reader in a way impossible to Fielding, whose pictures of the poorer classes relied on accuracy of local colour rather than on an appeal to the reader's emotional susceptibility for their success. French taste was still unprepared to accept realism in the novelist's treatment of lower-class subjects. Its obstinacy in this matter helped to enforce the connexion of virtue and poverty in fiction that developed during the latter half of the century. Pamela, the servant, represents the cause of virtue combating evil in the shape of the wealthy Mr. B. Lovelace; the rich young profligate persecutes the patient and meek Clarissa who is lower in the social scale than he but far higher in the moral one. Richardson's moralizing attitude, his continually avowed object of inculcating virtue comes to be associated with the bourgeois, the artisan, and the peasant in fiction as a contrast to the aristocratic "roman licencieux." He first voices the idea that virtue is above class distinctions; Pamela, by her untiring resistance to the evil schemes of her master, is rewarded by a most respectable marriage with the reformed Mr. B. French critics deplored this notion of morality's superiority to birth and rank as highly dangerous. Of Voltaire's *Nanine*, which is written on a similar theme, that of the peasant girl who marries her master, one critic wrote that it encouraged pride and ambition in the bourgeoisie, "sentiments pernicious parmi les personnes du commun, qui tandis qu'elles se repaissent de ces chimères, négligent de devenir de bonnes ouvrières, chose plus utile mille fois et plus nécessaire dans un état que toutes ces comtesses imaginaires."

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Fielding's influence on French novelists in this question of the choice of character and scene from the life of the "petites gens" was not so great as Richardson's, but it made itself felt. In 1769 a minor novelist introduces a discussion on fiction into his novel and puts these words into the mouth of one of his characters, who is discussing Fielding, "C'est l'auteur qui a le mieux connu les mœurs du peuple, qui quoiqu' on dise, compose ordinairement la nation." He refers to contemporary art and the influence of Chardin and those who drew scenes of cottage, bourgeois, and peasant life in contrast to the courtiers of Watteau and Fragonard. "Un tableau de Pater ou de Chardin vous pique, vous enchante; pourquoi une autre sorte de peinture vous serait-il désagréable? Aux yeux du philosophe, le peuple n'est rien moins qu'un objet de dédain; tout lui sert d'objet de comparaison." Fielding made the French public aware of the great opportunities for local colour, for variety of speech, dress, and custom that the aristocratic novel had disregarded and which were only to be found amongst those classes obliged to work for their living. In *Tom Jones* he writes: "I will venture to say the highest life is much the dullest and affords very little humour or entertainment. The various callings in lower spheres produce the great variety of humorous characters." The English novelist had not, however, made his lower-class characters purely comic; they are representative of their class and not the exaggerated types of earlier realistic novels. *Tom Jones* has the same eternal universal quality that *Gil Blas* inherited from Molière's comedy, but he is also the representative type of a century which saw the intellectual advance of the bourgeoisie and their substitution of a natural religion, based on the importance of feeling and motive, for the orthodox Christianity that Richardson preached.

Although Richardson's popularity in France encouraged that type of novel dealing with the prolonged sufferings of some virtuous and persecuted heroine, which rapidly lost any former claim to "varisemblance," Fielding, on the other

## LITERARY TASTE AND DEMOCRACY

hand, gave an impetus to the current of realism creeping into fiction. It makes its appearance spasmodically, in the brutal pictures of lower-class Parisian life of La Mothe's *Margot des Pelotons*, in the picaresque adventures of Nougaret's *Astuces de Paris*, or the more sympathetic portrayal of poorer folk in Gorgy's *Blançay*. These are novels that pretend to give a fairly accurate picture of the middle and lower classes and which, thanks to the influence of the English writers, differ considerably from the "genre poissard" written about 1740. The latter type of novel dealt with the life of the Parisian artisan and the inhabitants of the "Halles," and was written by the Comte de Caylus and his friends solely for the amusement of the upper-class reader who regarded the poorer folk of Paris with the amazement and interest that he might be expected to bestow upon some creature from another planet. Caylus naturally, as one of the favoured class, writes with certain aristocratic prejudices. In his desire to amuse he singles out any trait that startles by its brutality, its naïveté or its humour. The Parisian workman or shopkeeper plays a sorry rôle in these novels. He is described as vicious, noisy and vulgar, consumed with greed for wealth, anxious to exploit the upper classes, and capable of any knavery in order to do so. The historical value of these sketches of eighteenth-century poorer class life is none the less great that they are written by so unsympathetic an observer. Caylus, Voisenon, Vadé, and the other writers of this "genre poissard" are all swayed by popular taste in this question of whether the masses are a fit subject for literature. They are prepared to explore all the possibilities of humorous treatment, but refuse to treat them seriously and sympathetically. They write as external observers who have frequented the market-places, entered the "boutiques" of the poorer quarters, heard the conversation between shopkeeper and customer or the comments of the crowd as the courtiers pass in their carriages on their way to Versailles, but they have never penetrated into their houses, nor seen the struggle to

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

keep body and soul together, nor realized the anger and hatred roused in the heart of the shopkeeper whose aristocratic customers contemptuously bullied him and then refused to pay their debts. Like the gaily glittering life of Versailles, the eighteenth-century novel was in a sense a sham, a creation of convention that only rarely allowed a glimpse of the life of the greater part of the nation, the still almost inarticulate class that was a few years later to smash political, social, and literary conventions with the taking of the Bastille.

Gradually, however, the novel was obliged to reflect a change that was taking place in the relations of the noble and bourgeois. The latter was slowly but surely penetrating the ranks of wealth and birth owing to the reckless extravagance of the aristocracy. The nobility, in its need to find ready money which the impoverished peasants refused to supply any longer, was forced to turn for help to the wealthy bourgeois financiers and the *fermiers généraux* who, having gained their riches in trade abroad or under Law's financial system, had acquired a certain social standing by purchasing some public office. The nobility borrowed money from them or, like Mme de Sevigné's grandson, married their daughters. This dependence of the thriftless aristocracy on the wealthy bourgeois meant the latter's penetration into court society and his appearance in novels of "la bonne compagnie." A still closer connexion existed between the court and the stage, whose actors and actresses were drawn mainly from the bourgeois and artisan classes. The "petits maîtres" of the Regency and Louis the Fourteenth's reign found the "comédiennes" a refreshing change from the ladies of the court. They spent enormous sums on these daughters of the populace who were drawn to the stage by the meretricious glory surrounding the name of actress and by the greater freedom offered in this profession. The average bourgeois, according to the novelist, hated and despised the stage and all connected with it, whose names were in general synonymous with vice and depravity. He regarded actors as minions of a



## LITERARY TASTE AND DEMOCRACY

vicious aristocracy of which he felt himself growing daily more contemptuous and more independent.

In this attitude of the middle classes towards the stage and the nobility we see signs of the moralizing, somewhat priggish character that they so often assume both in contemporary drama and fiction. Richardson was largely responsible for this identification of the bourgeois with the cause of virtue, but he found ready approval amongst the rising middle classes of mid-eighteenth-century France. Inspired by the rationalists' doctrines of tolerance, love of humanity, and faith in human nature, they required the novel to give its readers a lesson in virtue and a stimulus in the story of the right persecuted but ultimately triumphant, for their sensibility. The more poverty-stricken the hero or heroine, the more his or her struggles to live a virtuous life aroused the compassion of the reader. Side by side with these novels of lower-class characters are those which voice the vague philanthropy of the "philosophes," novels such as Mme de Beaumont's *Nouvelle Clarisse*, or her *Magasin de Pauvres*. The hero and heroine of this type of novel are generally of noble birth, inspired by a love of humanity and the desire to lead a virtuous life, which obliges them to devote their time to alleviating the distress of the peasant. The benevolent seigneur, disciple of the physiocrats, who is a kindly despot to his peasant tenants, replaces the "petit maître" in fiction. He voices very often the fashionable ideas of man's equality and the aristocracy of virtue rather than of birth, but like his counterpart in history, he is no democrat. He will in the kindness of his heart improve the peasant's condition, but let not the latter think that he has any right to alter his circumstances for himself.

This vague sentimentality and tolerance of the eighteenth century found a stronger and more passionate voice in Rousseau. His novel, *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, is an expression of that peculiar sensibility already found in Richardson's works and to a lesser extent in Marivaux, a novel of philosophical purpose that preached the virtue of true feeling. It voiced

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

the bourgeois belief that true nobility is of the heart rather than of social rank. The claim of the plebeian Saint-Preux to the hand of the patrician Julie is in Rousseau's eyes justified by the depth of his passion. He expresses what other writers had been tentatively suggesting, that rank does not presuppose nobility of character, that the "petites gens" are as capable of the more subtle and refined emotions or of a "grande passion" as any lord or lady of the aristocratic novel. The peasant in the late eighteenth-century novel differs considerably from the slow-witted yokel of earlier fiction and drama described by the nobility as "un grand pendard et un coupe-jarret." His brutality and gross materialism are replaced by a tenderness of heart and capacity for affection, so dear to the romantics of the pre-Revolution period. Léonard, a minor novelist writing in 1783, tells us of a peasant girl, having lost her lover in the war, whose "organes trop délicats n'ont pu résister à cette perte, et sa tête s'est dérangée"—a remarkable contrast with the heartless Margots and Javottes of earlier fiction. Rousseau, with his "back to nature" theory, had extolled the peasant as the type nearest to nature and therefore the most virtuous and unspoiled. This romantic conception of the workers on the land, which was extended to all the poorer folk, transformed contemporary fiction. The pre-Revolution novel, represented by a host of minor writers such as Léonard, Mme de Beaumont, Florian, and Gorgy, is full of idyllic scenes of peasant life whose simplicity and kindliness delighted the jaded marquises and comtes who had fled to their country houses, where they might marvel over the beauties of nature and "écouter parler leur cœur."

Although the worship of nature continues in the works of Chateaubriand and the Romantic poets, the sentimental idealist attitude to the lower classes undergoes some change towards the end of the century, due partly to the upheaval of the Revolution and partly to a sudden and unexpected appearance of the most crude realism in the novel. Rétif de

## LITERARY TASTE AND DEMOCRACY

la Bretonne's works, which were poured out in their numerous volumes several years before and during the Revolution, are the first real contributions of the lower classes themselves to fiction. The son of a Burgundy farmer, he declared that his object in writing was to describe the life of the artisan and peasant, not for the amusement of the aristocracy but for the interest of the working folk themselves. Unlike Rousseau, who also had turned his attention to this new public of the "petites gens," he gives no romantic picture of these toilers and sufferers under the *ancien régime*. His pictures of the lower classes of Paris and the provinces are from the pen of a writer who was more of a journalist than a novelist. He is the "colporteur" of the poor, like his earlier counterpart who amused his wealthy customers with all the latest court scandal. This "hibou spectateur," as he styles himself, who was wont to prowl nightly through the Paris slums, has described those whose poverty and squalor he shared for many years, with a brutal realism unknown hitherto in fiction. In his championship of the working classes, despite their bestiality and vice, he sounds the first really revolutionary note in the novel. The artisans, shopkeepers, and peasants claim the consideration of all thinking people, not as examples of idyllic virtue over whom Rousseau and his disciples waxed eloquent, but because they are "importants, utiles, nécessaires, indispensables." It is one more step towards a realistic treatment of the non-aristocratic classes in fiction.

That literary taste had changed with the gradual breaking down of the barriers between the classes is evident by the fact that Rétif's novels aroused no criticism for their exclusion of all but lower-class characters. Critics condemned his coarseness and lack of taste, but saw nothing unsuitable in this democratic trend of the novel. With the political changes of 1789, the people's place in serious fiction was assured.

An examination of the novel in a country governed, like

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

France under the *ancien régime*, by aristocratic conventions and prejudice, reveals the bourgeois's greatest contribution to fiction as a certain truth and realism, unknown to the aristocratic novel. The increase of local colour of varied and detailed background is simultaneous with the widening of the novelist's field and choice of character from the lower classes. The classical and aristocratic literary conventions vanished when faced with the combined forces of eighteenth-century sensibility and realism, both associated in literature with the bourgeois and artisan, just as aristocratic privileges disappeared under the attacks of the "philosophes" and the Jacobins. A new structure of society, where, as Balzac clearly saw, the power was with the wealthy rather than with the aristocracy, meant a new type of literature in which naturally the middle classes, the artisan and the peasant would take the place of the vanished nobility. Writers in the treatment of these new types in fiction either continued to idealize them as Rousseau and most of the late eighteenth-century novelists had done, or adopted the realistic treatment of Rétif de la Bretonne. George Sand and Hugo belong to the former group by their romantic attitude towards the peasant, the woman, the convict even, and the *déclassés* of the new bourgeois society. Balzac, Maupassant, and Flaubert, on the other hand, are in a sense opponents of contemporary society, hating the bourgeois and describing the peasant in more pessimistic terms than the most realistic writers of the previous century. Democracy had found its priests and worshippers in literature, but, by its very nature, had found as soon its critics and opponents, whose voices, directed against the class that had founded this new society, would have been silenced had they attacked an aristocratic régime.

The uselessness and the impossibility of binding literature down with rigid conventions and prejudices which make it a dead thing, divorced from the life and society that has produced it, are apparent in this transformation of so artificial

## LITERARY TASTE AND DEMOCRACY

a product as the seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century novel. It is an example of the slow but unrelenting pressure of social forces upon a static type of literature that endeavoured, by an arbitrary standard of good taste, to resist the changes gradually taking place in national life. There is significance in the fact that the new type of novel is not the work of one or two writers of genius (Rousseau alone stands out from among the later eighteenth-century novelists), but the combined efforts of a host of minor writers who answer the needs of a changing public rather than dictate new trends in the novel by the force of their individual talent. The success of the *Nouvelle Héloïse* was due partly to the force and freshness of Rousseau's eloquence, but still more to the fact that he echoed the mood of the times for a more romantic, more spontaneous conception of love. The man of talent or of genius will have some influence, probably short-lived and confined to a few disciples, but his individual importance cannot contend with the greater social forces that slowly but inevitably compel literature to closer connexion with the needs and desires of the society that has produced it.

### **Chateau De Bures** **par Orgeval, Seine et Oise, France**

*A Country Boarding School for English and American Boys. Ages 7-18.*

Delightful situation in spacious park near Paris. Ideal living conditions. Unusually adequate accommodation and equipment. Careful supervision of health. Individual instruction offered by competent staff of English, French, German and American teachers. Your boy can learn to speak French while preparing for Oxford or Cambridge.

*Prospectus on Application.*



## MONTAGU DAVID EDER

WITH the death of Dr. Eder on March 30th the Institute has lost one of its earliest and most distinguished members and social science a thinker and investigator of rare gifts and breadth of vision. Of the great value of his contributions to psycho-pathology the medical and psychological journals have borne witness. He was one of the first in England to practise psycho-analysis and he did heroic work in spreading the knowledge of this discipline not only among medical men but among a wider public. His passionate sympathy with suffering, especially mental suffering, his powers of imaginative insight, and his wisdom, made him not only an analyst of rare quality but also a sure guide and counsellor to his friends. In the history of social service his name will be remembered for his pioneer work in the establishment of voluntary school clinics in the poorest districts of London and for the part that he played in the nursery school movement. When, as an outcome of the voluntary clinics, the School Medical Service was started by the London County Council, he became one of its first medical officers. He also started and edited *School Hygiene*, a magazine devoted to this enterprise. His services to the Jewish people are widely known. He was particularly active in the Zionist movement and helped to shape its policy with wisdom and courage during the critical period following the war. He gave up five years of his psycho-analytic practice to work in Palestine. Members of Le Play House will recall with interest that he induced the late Professor Patrick Geddes to come out to Palestine, where he made the first sketch for the University and provided much stimulus and inspiration. In all his work he knew how to link practical and theoretical activities in a way seldom encountered among people living so full and energetic a life. His wide knowledge of the history of civilization and of primitive cultures, derived from the close and assiduous study

## MONTAGU DAVID EDER

of books, was balanced by an equally wide and profound experience of life gained at first hand in many parts of the world and by an insight into human nature impressive alike in its detachment and objectivity and in its humour and kindness.

His distinctive contribution to sociology lies in his efforts to apply the findings of psycho-analysis to the elucidation of social phenomena. The numerous articles which he devoted to this theme will command the attention even of those who are not prepared to accept the teachings of psycho-analysis in their entirety. They are all distinguished for their shrewd insight, ripe experience, and freedom from illusion, and for a genuine modesty due to his vivid realization of the complexities of human character. Though he never found time for a systematic exposition of his social theory, the articles which he contributed show that he had a very clear conception of the nature of sociology and its relations to other social sciences and social philosophy, and especially of the great possibilities of social psychology.<sup>1</sup>

Members of the Institute will recall Dr. Eder's contribution to the symposium held under its auspices in 1923 and published later with the title, *Social Aspects of Psycho-analysis*. Taking politics in the inclusive Greek sense as the science of man in society, Dr. Eder discusses in the light of psycho-analytic theory the nature of the social bond, the forces making for conservatism and radicalism, the different forms of social revolution, and the psychology underlying different forms of government. In this as well as in a later paper dealing with psychology of social revolution he utilizes the Freudian conception of social life as based on a conflict

<sup>1</sup> Cf. "Psycho-Analysis in relation to Politics" in *Social Aspects of Psycho-Analysis*, Ed. E. Jones, 1924; "Psychology and Value," *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1930; "The Myth of Progress," *Ibid.*, 1932; "A Contribution to the Psychology of Snobbishness," *Zeitschrift für Aerztliche Psychoanalyse*, 1925, vol. XI; "Is the Unconscious Educable?" *Report of the 14th Annual Conference of Educational Associations*, January 1925; "The Sterilisation of the Unfit," *Proceedings of the Sexual Reform Congress*, 1930; "On the Economics and Future of the Super-Ego," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 1929. "The Jewish Phylacteries and other Jewish Ritual Observances," *Ibid.*, 1933.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

between the fundamental impulses of love and aggression. But in the later paper he develops the Freudian doctrine by distinguishing between primary or inborn aggression and secondary or provoked aggression, the product of frustration and repression, and he takes a more hopeful view than does Freud of the possibility of diminishing the scope of secondary aggression by methods of social amelioration and radical changes in the upbringing of children and of controlling primary aggression by diverting it from the struggle between man and man to the struggle between man and external nature. His work here shows, I think, that the opposition often alleged between psycho-analysis and socialism is far from inevitable.

Dr. Eder's ethical theory is outlined in a paper on Psychology and Value, notable for its condensed thought and nobility of phrase. More clearly than any other psycho-analyst he recognized that in psycho-analysis an ethic is implicit, and he stresses the fact brought home by direct observation in many different parts of the world that ethical motives are common to all human beings, even to those who deny that their lives are so informed. His approach to the problem is, as was to be expected, biological and psychological. Value is regarded as a defensive quality which has developed in the interests of the preservation of the species. Human relations need regulation and the recognition of this need is the foundation of goodness. But goodness being a functional and not a structural variation is highly elastic in its embodiments, and this is seen in the changes it undergoes in different societies and especially in the tragic fact that the good has so often been the enemy of the better. An important and interesting suggestion is put forward of the function of the beautiful. Its task is to reconcile our unconscious striving for joy and complete gratification with our conscious experience of the imperfections and limitations of actual life. To avoid the pessimism to which a cold and objective view of the world would lead us, we

## MONTAGU DAVID EDER

displace our libidinal impulses on to things and endow them with qualities which serve to heighten the sense of life. The search for the value of truth too is based on the illusion of omniscience, a form of what Ferenczi has called man's incurable megalomania. Yet as a spur to thinking and research, this "infantile illusion" has biological utility. If the values of goodness, beauty, and truth are in a sense based on myths or illusions they are nonetheless important agents of civilization and they serve to bring about social transformations which, without involving any fundamental change in the structural basis of human nature, amount in Dr. Eder's view to an evolution of new human species.

These general ideas inspired Dr. Eder's lifelong efforts in the sphere of education and social reform. It must be accounted a great loss to science that he never worked out his social and educational theories in systematic form. One might imagine at first sight that a thinker who sums up the natural history of man in the sentence: "We are born mad, acquire morality, and become stupid and unhappy; then we die" could hardly have a hopeful view of the possibilities of education or of social reform. Yet his work in a wide range of social movements and the papers that he devoted to the problems of education, and especially his noteworthy address on the University of Jerusalem, show clearly that his profound sense of the limits of human nature did not result in an apathetic acceptance of things as they are, but on the contrary spurred him on to discover what can be reasonably attempted within those limits. His ultimate position is far from sceptical or pessimistic. Both in his practical and theoretical activity he furnished abundant illustration of his own words: "Life is effort, adventure, joyous, just because there is an eternal quest without the possibility of final attainment."

MORRIS GINSBERG.

## BOOK REVIEWS

### HABITAT, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: A GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO ETHNOLOGY. By C. Daryll Forde.

With a frontispiece and 108 other illustrations and maps. Methuen. 1934. Price 15s.

The author of this work holds the Chair of Geography and Anthropology at Aberystwyth, and its sub-title, "A Geographical Introduction to Ethnology," suggests that its main object is to evaluate the geographical contribution to the understanding of human cultures. This is broadly true, but one of the outstanding characteristics of Professor Forde's book is its complete freedom from a specialist's bias. As he says himself in his final summarizing chapter: "Geographers, Economists and Sociologists have all on occasion produced a lay figure, a 'primitive man' stripped of reality and redressed according to need, with which to portray particular theories as to the rôle of physical circumstances in human affairs, as to the nature of social evolution or concerning the development of economic relations in human society." In general the thesis which geographers have sought to maintain is that differences of social development can be explained in terms of variation of natural conditions. Historically there have been two principal approaches to the subject from this standpoint. The first is particularly associated with Friedrich Ratzel, whose "Anthropogeographie" was one of the first systematic attempts to include the varying structure of human societies within the synthetic geographical "explanation" of the world. His methods had a profound influence on many subsequent writers, and are notably exhibited in Miss E. C. Semple's "Influences of Geographic Environment," a book which in some college departments of Geography in America is regarded as a classic and indeed as almost a gospel of human geography. The other approach was not primarily originated by professional geographers, but by a sociologist who realized that generalizations regarding the form and problems of particular societies without a full study of their geographical setting ("place") were often dangerous and misleading. The *Les Ouvriers Européens* of Le Play was the inspiration of a large number of geographical contributions to sociology by French disciples. Two in particular have had a wide circulation, Demolins's *Comment la Route crée le Type Social* and De Prévilles's *Le Sociétés Africaines*. The works of these two schools certainly rendered an important service to sociology by insisting on the broad correlation of types of social organization with types of geographical environment, but, as in the case of so many pioneer efforts, they tended to over-simplify the problems which they sought to elucidate and endeavoured to explain by rigid formulas of geographical control social phenomena of great complexity



## BOOK REVIEWS

and diverse origins. Protests against such superficial geographical determinism have not been lacking, particularly in the brilliant, if somewhat elusive, book of L. Febvre: *A Geographical Introduction to History*, with its challenging contention that "There are no necessities but everywhere possibilities, and man, as the master of the possibilities, is the judge of their use." The excellent studies of American aboriginal societies by Clarke Wissler have also done much to place the geographical factors in human cultures in their right perspective. But it has been left to Professor Forde to make for the first time a comprehensive survey from this standpoint of all the major types of primitive and traditional societies. He has brought to his task not only an admirable technique and a cool, dispassionate judgment, but a scholar's knowledge and appreciation of the relevant data. The result is a really notable book, of great value to students of human geography and an important contribution to social science as a whole. Its method is to "proceed inductively from the minute analysis of each actual society," such as the Semang and the Sakai of the equatorial forest and the Kazak, Kirghiz, and Kalmuk of the central Asiatic steppe, and to study the culture both in its geographical setting and, so far as the data are available, as an historical development which has been conditioned by many factors. For this purpose he describes and analyses in the first three Parts of the book a large number of typical societies in various parts of the world under the broad categories of "Food Gatherers," "Cultivators," and "Pastoral Nomads" respectively. In the fourth and last Part he summarizes his conclusions as to the major types of primitive societies, their origins and relationships, and their significance as adjustments to given types of geographical environment. In these final chapters many generalizations are packed into short compass and some of them are naturally open to criticism. To take a single example, Professor Forde speaks of "the fallacy of identifying Mohammedan religion, including its attitude to women, with a pastoral economy," and remarks that "the vast majority of Moslems are, and have been from the beginning, sedentary, cultivating peoples." To this as a complete statement it may be reasonably objected that the first and formative "Arabian" phase of Islam was intimately associated with such an economy, that much of the ritual and many of the precepts of Mohammedanism were more appropriate to life in the desert than to life in cultivated fields or cities, and that in the modern world the most typical, certainly the most austere, exponents of that religion are to be found among such peoples as the Wahabis of Central Arabia, who are essentially pastoralists. But whatever differences of view there may be on some of his final generalizations, they represent a synthesis of great value which can be tested and discussed in the light of his earlier chapters.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

In this book Professor Forde is almost entirely concerned with primitive and traditional communities prior to the impact of the Western economic system on their organization. He is careful to point out that the new process which this has set in motion differs only in intensity from other great cultural diffusions in the past. At the same time in the range and magnitude of its influence it is unparalleled. If at some future time Professor Forde, in his dual capacity of geographer and anthropologist, would give us an equally systematic survey of the vast problems of social reconstruction and readaptation to local environment which it is necessitating, he would add greatly to the debt which we already owe to him.

P. M. ROXBV.

SEASONAL VARIATIONS IN EMPLOYMENT. By C. T. Saunders.  
*Longmans, 1936. 15s.*

If one were to ask half a dozen economists, selected at random, for their opinion as to the magnitude of seasonal unemployment in this country, I suspect that the range of their estimates would be too considerable to inspire much confidence. If they were also asked for an impromptu account of seasonal unemployment as a problem, I suspect that these accounts would be essentially similar, but that their brevity and generality might well suggest a general lack of thorough and scientific study. Most economists probably feel uncomfortable when discussing this aspect of unemployment, but the only justification for its almost complete neglect must be either that its magnitude is negligible, or that as a problem it is simple, straightforward, and insoluble. If our economists lend support to either of these ideas—and I suspect several would do so—then Mr. Saunders' book is going to give them a rude awakening.

"The aggregate figures of unemployment in Great Britain show remarkably little seasonal variation" because "in Great Britain no one industry predominates and the seasonal patterns in the different industries to a considerable extent counteract each other." But "the total number of insured workers who some time during the year become unemployed on account of regular seasonal fluctuations varies from about six to eight hundred thousand, or from 5 per cent. to 7 per cent. of the insured population. The *average* number seasonally unemployed during the year is about 230,000 to 300,000, or 2 to 2½ per cent. of those insured. Both these proportions tend towards the higher end of the range in years of high general unemployment, for seasonal fluctuations tend to increase in amplitude during depressions."

If the determination of the magnitude of seasonal unemployment were the sole object of his book, Mr. Saunders, if he reads this review, might well feel towards the present reviewer as the author of a detective story must feel towards a reviewer who "gives away" his plot! But Mr.

## BOOK REVIEWS

Saunders has not been content with establishing conclusions as to magnitude, even though the first forty pages of the book and the appendices must have cost him and his assistants at the Economics Research Section of the University of Manchester a great deal of statistical labour. Incidentally the presentation of this statistical work is excellent: just the necessary amount of detail is simply set forth in the text and the data are relegated to the appendices. Having thus determined the statistical aspects, Mr. Saunders in Chapter III considers in general the causes and effects of seasonal fluctuation. He then studies the problem in relation to particular industries, and the next six chapters deal with the motor, clothing, and building industries, with wholly seasonal occupations, and with agricultural occupations. Finally, in the light of both the general study and these particular studies, Mr. Saunders considers whether the changing structure of British industry will lead to greater stabilization in the future, and discusses various possible remedial measures as well as methods of reducing seasonal fluctuation in the employment of the individual worker.

This brief summary of the scope of the book shows that it is no mere statistical investigation but an all-round study of the problem. At the same time the statistical investigation is in a way the most satisfactory part, for the studies of particular industries were apparently undertaken not for the purpose of studying the problems of seasonal unemployment in the concrete with a view to a more detailed analysis and the formulation of detailed practical remedial policies, but with a view to discovering whether seasonal unemployment is likely to increase or decrease. Actually, in attacking this latter issue, Mr. Saunders sheds a great deal of light on the practical problem in particular industries—more than enough to show at any rate that the problem differs in each industry and is by no means simple and straightforward, but equally that it is far from being insoluble. Yet Mr. Saunders does not take us nearly far enough in these practical directions, as he himself would doubtless be the first to admit. For example, he emphasizes that seasonal fluctuations mean increased costs of production, but he hardly attempts to try to discover how great is this increase in the different industries. Again he tells us that it costs 2 per cent. more to build a house in winter than in summer, but he gives us no idea of the extent to which it would pay a contractor to cut his price in order to get more winter work. But it must be remembered that his own objective in undertaking these studies of particular industries did not demand such investigations. We may, indeed, agree with Professor Daniels when he says in his Preface that Mr. Saunders “has broken the ground for many particular enquiries,” and that these ought now to be undertaken: and may we add the hope that the Economics Research Section have already made, or are about to make, a start both on detailed

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

investigations in particular industries, and on more detailed studies of certain aspects of seasonal unemployment? In particular we want to know much more about the effects on the seasonal worker's life, health, and happiness resulting from seasonal fluctuations in his income and activity, how he attempts to meet them, and so on, for Mr. Saunders has hardly touched this side of the problem, and it must not be dismissed as similar to the sociological aspects of cyclical unemployment. Meantime let us be grateful for what Mr. Saunders has given us, for he has supplied much fact and many ideas, and perhaps most important of all he has awakened us to the importance and the complexity of a problem which has too long been complacently neglected.

J. W. F. ROWE.

REACTIONARY ENGLAND AND OTHER ESSAYS. By H. R. G. Greaves. London: The Acorn Press, 1936. 5s.

Mr. Greaves does his excellent little book an injustice in giving it the title he has chosen for it. Several essays here printed might reasonably be grouped under his title, but others—the two admirable essays on Locke and Linguet, for instance—cannot be. Behind all the essays, it is true, there is the strong and coherent political philosophy that Mr. Greaves holds, but a more general title would have won more readers. Nevertheless, the points that Mr. Greaves makes to justify his title are well worth making. The first essay, on the police and on the attitude of the magistrates to the more displeasing activities of the police, is very timely and very disquieting. Whether all the developments noted by Mr. Greaves are as new as he suggests I rather doubt. The poor have long had reason to know that a policeman was not always a kindly soul helping a child or a blind man across the street, but this realistic view is now being more widely shared. One reason for this increase of scepticism towards the police is not ideological in origin but technical. If the comfortable middle-class man listens with a certain irony to the testimonials given to the legal system by its luminaries, it is not because of the menace of fascism, but because of the lessons learned by the motorist. A class which never expected to enter a police court has had to enter it and has discovered what police evidence can mean, has had occasion to observe that admirable *esprit de corps* by which police witnesses, in the best spirit of the British constitution, all tell the same story, just like cabinet ministers. The middle-class man has also learned that when offered a half-crown (or even more) not all policemen turn purple with indignation—something publicans and street-bookies knew long ago. Mr. Greaves discusses as an aspect of the decline of liberty the censorship of books and pictures on moral grounds. Here it is harder to see signs of reaction. Even if you think that any restriction on the sexual morals of the private citizen is an intrusion on the Englishman's castle, there is surely no sign that

## BOOK REVIEWS

there has been a recession in liberty since mid-Victorian times? In the eighteenth century, a tolerant or admiring government could give the author of *Fanny Hill* a pension, but would either of the Labour Home Secretaries have acted very differently from Jix? The late Lord Brentford was not a deep thinker and he had not quite all the courage of his convictions, but when he and his friends argued that no artistic merit could cover up moral faults, they were, given the premises officially accepted by both sides, right. No doubt D. H. Lawrence could put up a better case for himself, but what English publisher is willing to go into court and argue that (apart from the question of minors) what an adult reads is his own business, be it bad art or bad morals? If you do not take this line the censors will say that the better written a book the more dangerous it is, the better painted a picture the more insidious. Surely they are right? The brown-paper volumes sold surreptitiously, the *graffiti* on lavatory walls, are less dangerous to orthodox sexual morals than the writings or even the paintings of D. H. Lawrence. Any change in the present state of the law will have to wait on public opinion, which is still, in the main, Christian in theory if not in practice. There is a real clash in moral judgments in which the censors have the courage of their convictions; their opponents, too often, have not. Meantime, something could be done (if contempt of court could be avoided) in educating the bench. When an American judge in a sexual case indulges in high moral indignation and wishes he could have the criminal in the dock flogged, some part of the Press is sure to comment with candour on the interesting revelation of the sadistic mind of the judge. Here, alas, this is not done and the most complacent members of a complacent profession, the judges (including recorders and so on) bask in their self-approval. What the English courts need is more of the spirit of the *Canard Enchaîné* or of the *New Yorker*. A beginning might be made by attacking the fiction that innocence is assumed until guilt is proved, an assumption quite incompatible with the treatment of prisoners awaiting trial. If all prisoners awaiting trial were housed at the Ritz it would be a step in the right direction and if more leading legal lights spent a little time in jail there would be a move in that direction. Of the essays on political theory, the defence of Linguet is the most novel and the explanation of Locke the most timely, but Professor Namier might demur to the assertion of the old view that Montesquieu was blind to the realities of English politics when he praised the separation of powers. Perhaps Locke was the less good observer if the more sagacious theorist.

D. W. BROGAN.

**DIVORCE AND ITS PROBLEMS.** By E. P. S. Haynes and Derek Walker-Smith. Pp. 183. *Methuen*. 5s.

This is a timely survey of the peculiar complexity and illogicality of



## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

the English divorce law. It analyses the development of the law, and compares the present position here with that in other countries. Finally, it suggests the inclusion of desertion and cruelty as single and sufficient grounds for divorce, and stages a debate on the motion that divorce by mutual consent should be made possible. It is this last section which shows how necessary is a sociological approach to the divorce question.

Mr. Derek Walker-Smith attacks divorce by mutual consent for the following reasons. First, that it will inevitably mean extorted consent; secondly, that it is unfair to the wife; thirdly, that the children of a marriage dissolved in this way are placed in a peculiarly difficult position; and, finally, that so easy a means of divorce will inevitably help in the dissolution of the family unit. But Mr. Walker-Smith takes an unduly simple view of the problem to reach such conclusions. Reconsideration of the same arguments used against divorce by mutual consent might lead to totally different deductions.

In the first place there is no reason why extorted or unwilling consent should be more prevalent under the new law than under the present one. Only a particularly calculating husband would undertake a continuous campaign against his wife in order to extract her consent to a divorce, and such a husband would find no greater difficulty in achieving his end to-day. Nor, if resort to such methods is had, does there appear to be any valid reason for prolonging the marriage, provided that the wife receives due legal recompense. Secondly, Mr. Walker-Smith's anxiety for the financial position of a wife divorced by mutual consent could be allayed quite easily by including an appropriate settlement clause in the new law. Nor, in the third place, would it be more difficult to provide for the children of the marriage. Admittedly there is an important psychological problem attaching to the children, but their life is hardly likely to be worse after the divorce than with parents whose only common link is a mutual detestation. Finally, in discussing the relation between divorce and the future of the family, it is unwise to quote Russia as an example of resultant disintegration. After fundamental modifications in the divorce law there is bound to be a short period during which a section of the married population takes advantage of the new facilities. Moreover, to regard divorces in a few towns in Russia as indicative of the general position of the family in the country as a whole is no more scientific than to use the Reno divorce rate as a guide to the trend of family life in the United States.

The point is—and it is shown by the divorce statistics of France, Holland, Sweden, and England and Wales—that divorce is not generally a step taken as soon as the first flush of married happiness has ended. For the majority of married people it is, on the contrary, a step only taken

## BOOK REVIEWS

after a good deal of consideration and many attempts at compromise. In that case, the introduction of divorce by mutual consent is unlikely seriously to change the attitude of those people who regard marriage as something more than a legally licensed *affaire*. Since, also, the bulk of divorces relate to no- and one-child families, the problem of the children of a dissolved marriage would not be vastly aggravated.

Mr. Walker-Smith takes up a very laudable attitude. He says that "British life is based four-square on religion, the family, property, and traditional liberty, and divorce by consent cannot be introduced into a life governed by these principles and based on these institutions." But why not? If British life is really based on those principles and institutions, there is no need to fear the effects of divorce by consent. If not, we are scarcely likely to make a more wholesome unit of the family by impounding it behind the walls of legal restrictions. In fact, it would be better to let the divorce rate go rocketing upwards. We might at least have an opportunity of discovering what was wrong with the family.

D. V. GLASS.

**SOUTH WALES NEEDS A PLAN.** By H. A. Marquand assisted by Gwynne Meara. *Allen & Unwin*. 1936. 7s. 6d.

This book has great merits. It is studiously practical and constructive, admirably free from partisan prejudice of any kind, and put together in a way which makes it easy for the reader to see *both* the wood *and* the trees. To this it need hardly be added that the authors write with a knowledge of their problem which (at least for their own peace of mind) is only too extensive and too intimate.

Building on the University of Wales survey of 1931-2 (which Professor Marquand himself directed) and the investigations of Lord Portal in 1934, Professor Marquand and Mr. Meara conclude that the surplus of labour which cannot hope to find employment again in the South Wales region in the ordinary course of an upward turn of the trade cycle cannot be estimated at less than 60,000 workers, young and old. A brief historical sketch shows how this intractable residuum of unemployment has come into being, and analyses its distribution between different parts of the region (a matter of some considerable importance), as well as its age-composition and the proportions in which it is drawn from different industries. Then, lest the reader should be inclined to shift responsibility, both for the creation of the present distress and for its cure, upon the "natural working of economic forces," we are reminded how largely the South Wales tragedy is the by-product result of deliberate State policy. War-time expansion, adherence to the gold standard, tariffs and economic nationalism, are diagnosed as the major causes of the present difficulties, which again have been aggravated by economy in coal consumption, by

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

the growing use of alternative fuels (and now, as must be added since the book appeared, by the imposition of Sanctions). The authors argue that the State cannot simply shut its eyes to these consequences of what it has itself done. Hence some such plans as those which they propose are in their view but the logical outcome of action already taken.

There follows an analysis of the essential conditions which any plan for South Wales must satisfy, together with sketches of the lines of two possible plans—a “blue” one which might commend itself to a Government of the Right, and a “pink” one for those more socialistically inclined. Either alternative, however, it is claimed, is capable of being put into operation within the existing framework of society. There is thus no question of the pink plan having to wait upon wholesale socialization of industry, or other equally drastic changes. Both plans include an extended scheme of pensions for older workers (the pink version being naturally more expensive and more comprehensive than the blue), a rise in the school-leaving age, a programme of public works, provision of subsistence holdings on the land for some of the men in late middle life who are never likely to get work again, and large schemes of afforestation. The last three items, it is suggested, might be carried so far further under a Left Government than under one of the Right as to find employment for 5,000 more workers under the pink plan than under the blue one. Beyond this, it is pointed out that the declared Labour policy for the control of investment might well be used to encourage the investment of capital in new industries (as to the possible nature of which valuable suggestions are made) in South Wales.

It remains only to add that behind all the courage and enterprise of this book one cannot but be aware of certain fundamental dilemmas. Essentially the authors are making an *ex parte* statement, pleading the cause of a part, which, for all its tragic sufferings, still remains a part, and not the whole. Scattered through these pages there are indeed signs enough that the authors are well aware of this, and the very moderation of their proposals is itself evidence that theirs is no narrow partisanship. But, inevitably, in the desperate attempt to satisfy the crying need at their door, they must ignore wider issues of policy. Thus, to take only one example, the development of small subsistence holdings in the valleys of South Wales is, on a large view, a crazy policy in a world where lands far more suitable for the production of food are ruined by “over-production.” But how can such considerations count when with their own eyes Professor Marquand and Mr. Meara can see the wreckage of their distressed areas salvaged on little pig and poultry farms? And yet it is just these wider issues that will ultimately determine the prospects of prosperity, if not, indeed, of survival, for South Wales equally with the rest of the world.

BARBARA WOOTTON.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- Angell (R. C.). *THE FAMILY ENCOUNTERS THE DEPRESSION*. Scribner.  
 Brainard and Zeleny. *PROBLEMS OF OUR TIMES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PLANNING*. McGraw-Hill. 8s. 6d.  
 Carr-Saunders (A. M.). *WORLD POPULATION*. O.U.P. 12s. 6d.  
 Colcord (J. C.). *CASH RELIEF*. Russell Sage. \$1.50.  
 Cossio (C.). *EL CONCEPTO PURO DE REVOLUCION*. Barcelona. 12 ptas.  
 Davie (M. R.). *WORLD IMMIGRATION*. Macmillan. 16s.  
 Dawson (C. A.). *CANADIAN FRONTIERS OF SETTLEMENT*. Macmillan. 17s.  
 Glass (D. V.). *THE STRUGGLE FOR POPULATION*. O.U.P. 7s. 6d.  
 Harmsen and Lohse. *BEVÖLKERUNGSFRAGEN*. München.  
 Hayashi (K.). *THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF STATE SOCIALISM*. Tokyo. \$0.60.  
 Hicks (G. D.). *THOUGHT AND REAL EXISTENCE*. O.U.P. 2s.  
 House (F. N.). *THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY*. McGraw-Hill. 24s.  
 Hutt (W. H.). *ECONOMISTS AND THE PUBLIC*. Cape. 15s.  
 Jeans, Bragg, Appleton, Mellanby, Haldane, Huxley. *SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS*. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.  
 Kaye (M.). *CHILD WELFARE OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL*. Edinburgh. 6s.  
 Kuczynski (R. R.). *POPULATION MOVEMENTS*. O.U.P. 5s.  
 Kühne (O.). *THEORIE UND PRAXIS IM VÖLKISCH-SOZIALEN LEBEN*. Berlin.  
 La Pierre and Farnsworth. *SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*. McGraw-Hill. 21s.  
 Marr (G. S.). *SEX IN RELIGION*. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.  
 Muir (C.). *JUSTICE IN A DEPRESSED AREA*. Allen & Unwin. 6s.  
 Oakeshott (W. F.). *COMMERCE AND SOCIETY*. O.U.P. 7s. 6d.  
 Raglan (Lord). *THE HERO*. Methuen. 10s. 6d.  
 Rappard (W. E.). *L'INDIVIDU ET L'ETAT*. Zürich. Frs. ss. 12.  
 Rigaudias-Weiss (H.). *LES ENQUÊTES OUVRIÈRES EN FRANCE ENTRE 1830 ET 1848*. Alcan. 30 Fr.  
 Roberts (H.). *EUTHANASIA AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LIFE AND DEATH*. Constable. 7s. 6d.  
 Spencer (M.). *ECONOMICS AND GOD*. S.C.M. 4s.  
 Van de Wall (W.). *MUSIC IN INSTITUTIONS*. Russell Sage. \$3.00.  
 Van Vollenhoven (C.). *THE LAW OF PEACE*. Macmillan. 10s. 6d.  
 Von Schmid (J. J.). *THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR TIME*.  
 Wickwar (W. H.). *THE SOCIAL SERVICES*. Cobden-Sanderson. 10s. 6d.  
 Williams and Heath. *LEARN AND LIVE*. Methuen. 5s.  
 B.B.C. ANNUAL, 1936. 2s. 6d.  
 GUIDE TO CURRENT OFFICIAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1935. Stationery Office. 1s.  
 IRELAND TO-DAY. Vol. I, 1. Dublin. 1s.  
 THE REVIVAL OF AGRICULTURE. Rural Reconstruction Association. Allen & Unwin. 3s. 6d.  
 WHAT CROYDON READS. Report of the Libraries Committee of the County Borough.

## PERIODICALS RECEIVED

ADULT EDUCATION	June
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW	June
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY	June
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW	June
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY	July
ANTIQUITY	March, June, Sept.
ARCHIVIO DI STUDI CORPORATIVI	Vol. VII, 2
ASIATIC REVIEW	July

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

BALTIC COUNTRIES . . . . .	May
BULLETIN DE LA STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE LA FRANCE . . . . .	April, June
CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY . . . . .	June
ECONOMIC HISTORY . . . . .	Feb.
ECONOMICA . . . . .	Aug.
ETUDES SOCIALES . . . . .	May, June, July
EUGENICS REVIEW . . . . .	July
INSTITUTE OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY . . . . .	May
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION . . . . .	June
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW . . . . .	July, August
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF AGRICULTURE . . . . .	May, July
JOURNAL OF HEREDITY . . . . .	July
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY . . . . .	July
JOURNAL OF THE LONDON SOCIETY . . . . .	Sept.
KENT EDUCATION GAZETTE . . . . .	Aug.
MAN . . . . .	Sept.
MILGATE MONTHLY . . . . .	July, Sept.
MONIST . . . . .	July
MUSÉE SOCIAL . . . . .	May, July, Aug.
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY . . . . .	June
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION . . . . .	July
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS . . . . .	Aug.
RELIGIONS . . . . .	July
REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO . . . . .	Oct.-Dec.
REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE . . . . .	April-June
REVUE DES SOCIOLOGISTES . . . . .	March, April, May, June, July
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE . . . . .	May-June
REVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI . . . . .	Vol. VII, 3, 4
SBORNIK . . . . .	Vol. XI, 2, 3
SCIENTIA . . . . .	June, July, Aug.
SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE . . . . .	July
SOCIAL RESEARCH . . . . .	Aug.
SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH . . . . .	July-Aug.
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS . . . . .	June
TARSADOTOMTUDOMANY . . . . .	Jan.-June
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING . . . . .	Sept.
VIERTELJAHR SHEFT FÜR SOZIAL-UND WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE . . . . .	Vol. XXIX, 2
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV . . . . .	July



